Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds: Defending the Republic from the Threat of Sovereign Wealth Funds? by Bean, Bruce Winfield
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2009
Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds: Defending
the Republic from the Threat of Sovereign Wealth
Funds?
Bruce Winfield Bean
Michigan State University College of Law, beanb@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the Corporation
and Enterprise Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bruce Winfield Bean, Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds: Defending the Republic from the Threat of Sovereign Wealth Funds?, 18
Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 65 (2009-2010).
ATTACK OF THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:
DEFENDING THE REPUBLIC FROM THE THREAT OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS?
Bruce Winfield Bean*
I. THE THREAT FROM SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS .......................... 67
II. THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN
W EALTH FUNDS .............................................................................. 70
A. What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund? ................... . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . 70
B. When Did Sovereign Wealth Funds Appear? ........... . .. . . . .. . . . . . 72
C. Why Were Sovereign Wealth Funds Established? .................... 73
D. Why Is the Spotlight Now on Sovereign Wealth Funds? . . ........ 73
E. Explaining the Explosion in Disclosed Sovereign Wealth
Fund Investm ents ................................................................... 77
1. High Profile Investments .............................................. 80
2. CNOOC- Unocal - Chevron ................................... 80
3. Dubai Ports W orld ....................................................... 82
F. Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in the 2007 Economic
Slow dow n .............................................................................. 84
G. Financial Crisis: Sovereign Wealth Funds Stabilize Financial
Institutions ........................................................................... 86
H. Mortgage Problems Become a Crisis .................................... 86
III. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICA: ESSENTIAL FOR THREE
C EN TU RIES ......................................................................................... 87
A. The Impact of Recent International Developments ............... 88
B. The Modem Approach to Investment by Foreign Investors ...... 89
C. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ..... 90
1. CFIUS M embership ..................................................... 93
2. CFIUS Transactions ..................................................... 93
3. CFIUS Procedures ....................................................... 94
IV. THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES ......................................................... 96
V. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS ............ 98
A. SWF Investment Adjustments Arising from the Crisis ........... 101
B. The Crisis and the Chinese Reaction ....................................... 103
C. The Ice Cream Problem ........................................................... 104
V I. C ONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 106
A . G eneral O bservations .............................................................. 106
B. SWF's Unique Characteristic: Domestic Political Pressures.. 106
C . The B ottom Line ...................................................................... 108
APPENDIX A: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE ROSTER
O F SW F s .................................................................................................... 109
APPENDIX B: IWG GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES (GAPP) - SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES ........................................... 112
HeinOnline -- 18 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 65 2009-2010
Michigan State Journal of International Law
Consider this press release from the future:
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
..........................................................................................
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE November 22, 2014
WASHINGTON - Today, President Mercedes Chdvez announced that
Americans will now be required to spend one day a week without
electrical power. Details of the implementation of the new "conservation
blackouts" will be released tomorrow. Conservation blackouts will be
imposed across the United Sates, roughly corresponding to the geographic
outlines of our time zones. Hawaii will be included in the Mountain Time
Zone; Alaska will be blacked out during the same times as the Eastern
Time Zone.
This latest step toward a greener America has become necessary because
last evening the Board of Directors of Exxon Corporation unanimously
voted to divert all hydrocarbons it produces outside the United States to
the still booming Chinese market. After the board meeting, the Exxon
directors, who for the past two years have been nominated and elected by
the three sovereign wealth funds that together own 75.5% of Exxon's
outstanding voting stock, telephoned the President informing her, "as a
courtesy," that they "had reluctantly and with regret" determined that this
decision was in the best interests of Exxon and its shareholders. They
stated that the expanding Chinese economy, which has grown at more than
9% in each of the past fourteen years, would obviously be able to make
substantially more productive use of Exxon's crude oil and natural gas
than the U.S. economy, mired as it has been, in the Great Recession which
dates from 2007.
As we know, in 2010 and 2011, the escalation of fuel prices added trillions
of additional dollars to the sovereign wealth funds of a number of foreign
nations. Beginning in late 2011, in strict compliance with the Federal
Emergency Public Company Relief Act of 2011 ("EPCRA 2011 "),
controlling interests in many of America's largest corporations were
purchased by the sovereign wealth funds of Singapore, China, and four of
the United Arab Emirates. Their two-year buying spree in 2011 and 2012
resulted in what President Chdvez referred to in her election campaign as
the "extra-nationalization"1 of most major U.S. corporations. To
* Lecturer in Global Corporate Law, Michigan State University College of Law;
J.D. 1972 Columbia Law School; A.B. 1964, Brown University. The author acknowledges
the invaluable assistance in the preparation and writing of this article of Douglas Koenig,
MSU Law '10, and Ashley E. Bean. This article was originally presented as a paper at the
conference on 'The Global Interdependent Economy: Explorations of the Boundaries of
International Investment," organized by Michigan State Journal International Law on
February 13, 2009.
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"recycle" their huge dollar surpluses these sovereign wealth funds
purchased controlling interests in eighty-eight of the corporations
constituting the "Fortune 100." Once control of these companies had
been transferred offshore, the primary focus of each of these corporations
became support for the expanding consumer markets of Asia and Latin
America. This redirection of corporate purposes was in accord with
Restated Santiago Principle 25, adopted by the sovereign wealth funds
making up the International Working Group ("IWG") Principle 25 of the
IWG's Generally Accepted Principles and Practices ("GAPP") had been
announced by the IWG in August, 2011. GAPP 25 conditions the rescue of
America's struggling corporate giants by these sovereign wealth funds on
prior agreement by the U.S. Congress and the Administration's Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") to the realignment
of the primary business focus of the rescued companies to the vibrant,
expanding economies of China and Latin America. The reorientation of
the business purposes of the rescued companies required by GAPP 25 was
explicitly mandated in EPCRA 2011.
"In a separate announcement today, President Chdvez also lauded the
performance of America's new Smartmatique voting machines in the
recent mid-term election which gave her the support of an unprecedented
68.7% of the House of Representatives and 70% of the Senate. The
President also thanked her husband, Venezuela's Great Leader and
President for Life, Hugo Chdvez, for sending 1900 Venezuelan technicians
on very short notice to clear up what at first had appeared to be a major
technical flaw in the nation's electronic voting machines. ,2
I. THE THREAT FROM SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
The foregoing scenario is ridiculous, is it not?3 Given the current state of
hysteria, hyperbole, and utter nonsense in current American political
discourse, there may be those who assert that this is the fate we face from
the threat of sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs").
Some believe SWFs have already begun to take over the world. A
headline in the Christian Science Monitor asks, Will Sovereign Wealth
Funds Rule the World? The New York Times picked up this theme in an
editorial headlined, Who Will Come to the Rescue ?5 In the popular press,
1. This term was first used in 2009 by Douglas Koenig, a law student in my
Strategic International Transactions Seminar, to describe companies headquartered in one
country but under constructive control of a different sovereign.
2. See infra note 126.
3. Please note, the above scenario is entirely hypothetical.
4. David R. Francis, Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Rule the World?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2007, at 16.
5. Editorial, Who Will Come to the Rescue?, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at A22.
2009]
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Robert Samuelson, a respected columnist for Newsweek magazine, refers to
China's predatory trade practices, feeding the fear that China's investment
practices may also be predatory. 6  The International Herald Tribune
described concern in the European Union in an article entitled, Europe
Looks to Control State-Run Investors: Officials Wary of Intentions of China
and Russia.7
Candidates for political office have also chimed in. In a debate during
her campaign to become the Democratic Party's nominee for President in
2008, Senator Hillary Clinton declared, "[w]e need to have a lot more
control over what [sovereign wealth funds] do and how they do it."
8
Professors Milhaupt and Gilson, stars of the corporate governance
academy, have characterized the issue as one of "state capitalism as
opposed to market capitalism" 9 and proposed that shares of U.S. companies
in the hands of foreign states should lose their votes while so held.
Even Hollywood has picked up this theme. A recent James Bond
adventure takes on the global struggle for oil in "The World Is Not
Enough."' Perhaps the world is not enough, but Bond's title song reveals
that it is a "perfect place to start."1'
This Article presents the background of the current SWF phenomenon
and considers the supposed threat posed when SWFs either acquire outright
ownership of U.S. companies or accumulate significant equity ownership
stakes. 12
Part II of this Article reviews the evolution and development of SWFs
from their first appearance in the mid-twentieth century to the economic
crisis of 2007-2009. SWFs have been established by more than fifty
nations and subdivisions thereof with excess dollars and other foreign
currencies generated either by sales of oil and natural gas and other
commodities or by well-managed 3 balance of trade regimes. In particular,
Part II analyzes (i) the explosive growth of assets under management by
SWFs since 2004; (ii) their recent rise to prominence in public political
debate; and (iii) the outsized investments in major financial institutions that
6. Robert J. Samuelson, The China Conundrum: Using Tires to Send a Message,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.comid/215729.
7. Carter Dougherty, Europe Looks to Control State-Run Investors: Officials Wary
of Intentions of China and Russia, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 14, 2007, § News, at 1.
8. The Democratic Debate in Las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com2008/01/15/us/politics/I 5demdebate-
transcript.html?scp= l &sq=Democratic%20Debate%20in%2OLas%20Vegas&st=cse.
9. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1345, 1346,
1362-65 (2008).
10. THE WORLD Is NOTENOUGH (MGM Studios 1999).
I1. GARBAGE, THE WORLD Is NOT ENOUGH (MCA 1999).
12. See infra, part II.A, for a discussion of various definitions of this term.
13. The descriptor "well managed" is required because there are economies where
more than every available dollar is spent. The United States is only one such example.
[Vol. 18:1
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were once referred to as the "commanding heights"'4 of the economy, as an
important example of the role SWFs will have in the future.
Part 111 of this Article briefly summarizes America's long history of
regulation of investments by foreigners. Beginning with protections
originating in the early nineteenth century, Part 1I highlights the efforts to
regulate foreign investment, including the Congressional response to the
threat posed by SWFs, manifested in the July 2007 enactment of the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act ("FINSA").15 Part EI further outlines
the impact of FINSA on the administration of governmental reviews of
foreign investments by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States ("CFIUS"), 16 an entity within the Executive Branch.
Part IV of this Article considers recent actions taken by the leading
SWFs through the IWG to address concerns raised by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), whose member
countries have enjoyed large SWF investments. The 1WG published its
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices ("GAPP") in October, 2008.
The GAPP starkly demonstrates my principal assertion: SWFs will not, and
cannot be expected to, make commitments that will satisfy those who fear
the consequences of investments by such funds. The suggestion that
principles or practices, such as those included in GAPP, could be
implemented in a way that would alleviate such fears is at best self-
deluding. At worst it is a cynical political ploy. Indeed, such commitments
are impossible for any category of investor. To pretend that SWFs, created
by and ultimately responsible to sovereign nations, will make meaningful,
binding commitments not to act in their own best interests, is absurd on its
face. What has been suggested as "protection" for investee states would not
be agreed to by private investors and is a complete non-starter for SWFs.
Part V of this Article details the behavior of a few of the very largest
SWFs since the extent of the current economic crisis became apparent.17 It
14.
The term goes back three quarters of a century .... Lenin had
initiated the New Economic Policy, permitting a resumption of small
trade and private agriculture. Now, communist militants were
attacking him for compromising with capitalism and selling out the
revolution .... Lenin defended the program. Although the policy
allowed markets to function, he declared, the state would control the
"commanding heights," the most important elements of the economy.
See DANIEL YERG1N & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE
WORLD ECONOMY xii (2002).
15. See generally U.S. Treasury, Office International Affairs,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/intemational-affairs/cfius/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). See infra,
note 127.
16. See infra, note 115.
17. Charles Roxburgh, et al., Global Capital Markets: Entering a New Era,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., Sept. 2009, at 10 (stating that every equity market in the 112
2009]
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is instructive to consider how SWFs have acted because many of the tens of
billions of dollars they invested in the world's leading financial institutions
in 2007 and 2008 vanished in 2008 with the demise of Bear Steams,
Lehman Brothers, AIG, and others. How the SWFs behaved once the
enormity of the financial black hole that the crisis spawned became apparent
is an indicator of the threat they pose.
Part VI of this Article concludes with an appraisal of the behavior of
SWFs in the crisis and what is to be learned concerning the threat SWFs
pose.
II. THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
A. What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund?
The key characteristic of a SWF is its ownership and control by a
sovereign government. 18 There are a wide variety of definitions of a SWF.
The U.S. Treasury Department defines SWFs as "a government investment
vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages
those assets separately from the official reserves of the monetary
authorities."' 9 Deutsche Bank, a leading financial institution that follows
SWFs exhaustively, defines SWFs as "government-owned investment funds
which are commonly funded by the transfer of foreign exchange assets, and
which are set up to serve [their] objectives ... by investing the funds on a
long-term basis, often overseas. '20 The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute
("SWF Institute") describes a SWF as "a state-owned investment fund
composed of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other
financial instruments funded by foreign exchange assets. 21
nations it studies fell in 2008. Global equity losses totaled $28 trillion or 50% of the
aggregate).
18. "Sovereign" when used herein includes individual states of the United States,
such as Alaska, and individual emirates within the United Arab Emirates, such as Abu
Dhabi.
19. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES: APPENDIX SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 1 (June 2007),
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-exchange-rates/pdf/2007-
Appendix-3.pdf.
20. Steven Kern, SWFs and Foreign Investment Policies: An Update, DEUTSCHE
BANK RES. Oct. 22, 2008, at 2.
21. See, e.g., Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter SWF Institute];
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php [hereinafter SWF Rankings].
[Vol. 18:1
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The Monitor Company Group Ltd ("Monitor") - Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei ("FEEM"), a joint research project that focuses on SWFs, defines
SWFs narrowly so as to only include seventeen in their list of SWFs.
22
A Government Accountability Office ("GAO") study entitled "Report on
Foreign Investments" defines SWFs based upon their "outside" focus and
provides a four-element test for government policymakers.23
There are at least fifty-two funds that fall within the SWF Institute's
broad definition. 24  The smallest SWFs hold less half a billion dollars.
5
Each of the ten largest SWFs has assets exceeding $500 billion.26
22. Monitor and FEEM define a SWF on the basis of the essential characteristics that
differentiate them from other government-owned investment vehicles. Specifically, a SWF
must meet the following five criteria:
1. It is owned directly by a sovereign government;
2. It is managed independently of other state financial institutions;
3. It does not have predominant explicit pension obligations;
4. It invests in a diverse set of financial asset classes in pursuit of commercial
returns; and
5. It has made a significant proportion of its publicly-reported investments
internationally.
See generally MONITOR GROUP, QI 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.monitor.com/Portalsl0MonitorContentdocuments/MonitorSWFQ I_2009_Re
port.pdf.
23.
[The GAO] classified SWFs with the most interest to policymakers
as those that (1) are government-chartered or sponsored investment
vehicles; (2) invest some or all of their funds in assets other than
sovereign debt outside the country that established them; (3) are
funded through government transfers arising primarily from
sovereign budget surpluses, trade surpluses, central bank currency
reserves, or revenues from the commodity wealth of a country; and
(4) are not actively functioning as a pension fund (money received
from individuals).
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [GAO], SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: LAWS LIMITING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AFFECT CERTAIN U.S. ASSETS AND AGENCIES HAVE VARIOUS
ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES, GAO-09-608, at 5 (2009).
24. See infra App. A.
25. SWF Rankings, supra note 21 (noting Kiribati, Mauritania, and Indonesia
rankings).
26. The ten largest SWFs are Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Saudi Arabian
Monetary Authority ("SAMA"), Norway's Government Pension Fund -- Global, China's
State Agency for Foreign Exchange ("SAFE"), China Investment Corporation, Government
of Singapore Investment Corporation, Kuwait Investment Authority, Hong Kong Monetary
Authority Investment Portfolio, Russia's National Welfare Fund, and Singapore's Temasek
Holdings. SWF Rankings, supra note 21. The extreme size range of SWF assets becomes
clear when we compare the $550 million Kiribati fund with the Abu Dhabi fund, which is
more than 1000 times larger. Id.
2009]
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B. When Did Sovereign Wealth Funds Appear?
The first of what we now label SWFs appeared in 1953. The first SWFs
were referred to by terms descriptive of their purpose or origin,27 such as
"revenue equalization reserve funds,, 28 "stabilization funds, '29 or simply
"investment funds."30  This Article uses the accepted term, "sovereign
wealth fund," coined in 2005 by Andrew Rozanov at State Street Global
Markets.3'
Only fourteen SWFs existed prior to 1990.32 The first three SWFs were
established prior to 1967.33 Following those, five were established during
the 1970s; six were established in the 1980s; eight were established in the
1990s; ten were established during the five years beginning with 2000 and
ending in 2004; and nineteen were established after 2004 .34 However, the
date the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority began to act as a SWF is
unknown.
35
Thirty of these SWFs are funded with proceeds from the export of crude
oil or natural gas.36 Given the great commodity and consumer debt bubbles
of the first decade of the twenty-first century, bubbles that took the price of
crude oil from below $20 per barrel in the late 1990s to above $140 in
2007, 37 it is not a surprise that many SWFs are funded through the sale of
crude oil and other commodities. The commodity and debt bubbles also
help explain why nineteen SWFs have been established since 2004. Ten of
the SWFs established in the twenty-first century are funded, not by
27. 'The Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, a trust fund financed by phosphate
earnings over the years, is still an important part of the government's assets and contained
more than [ ] $554 million in 2006. Kiribati has prudently managed the reserve fund, which
is vital for the long-term welfare of the country." U.S. Department of State, Background
Note: Kiribati, (May 2009), http:llwww.state.gov/rlpaleilbgnl I836.htm.
28. "The Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, [was] established in 1956 to
invest the profits from a tax on bird-manure fertilizer exports .... " Kevin Hassett,
Sovereign Funds Offer U.S. Big Gains, Small Risk BLOOMBERG, Dec. 24, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.comapps/news?pid=20601039&sid=au8DAW5jHEks&refer=-home.
29. For example, in 1953, the Kuwait Investment Board began and now maintains
the Kuwaiti Future Generation Fund, and the Iran Oil Stabilisation fund was established in
1999. See SWF Institute, supra note 21.
30. Lee Hudson Teslik, Backgrounder on Sovereign Wealth Funds, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15251/ ("SWFs can invest in
whatever they want, just as if they were independent investment funds.").
31. See, e.g., Andrew Rozanov, Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?, ST. STREET
GLOBAL ADVISORs, Aug. 2005, at 1.
32. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A.
33. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A.
34. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A.
35. SWF Rankings, supra note 21 ("The ... Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
("SAMA"), was established as the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1952 to
handle growing foreign reserve funds.").
36. Id.
37. See infra Chart 3.
[Vol. 18:1
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commodity exports, but by balance of trade surpluses,38 derived in part from
the excessive debt that the United States and other consumers incurred and
spent in this period.
C. Why Were Sovereign Wealth Funds Established?
Each SWF has unique objectives. Since we are dealing with entities
controlled by sovereign governments, their investment philosophies and
goals need not be disclosed. They may also be changed or ignored at any
time. Nevertheless, SWFs often publish investment goals, and there are
likely purposes or goals which are common to SWFs. These goals include
investing to:
* Diversify away from non-renewable commodities; 39
* Increase the return on national savings;40
* Directly implement domestic economic development objectives; 4 1
* Invest currently unneeded dollar liquidity; 42 and
* Achieve long-term returns which preserve and enhance international
purchasing power of national assets.
4 3
D. Why Is the Spotlight Now on Sovereign Wealth Funds?
SWFs have been extensively covered in the news since 2006. Some
SWFs have existed for decades and have been quietly, and not entirely
secretly, investing internationally. For example, it is known that Temasek, a
SWF established by Singapore in 1974, has long held major interests in
regional entities such as Singapore Airlines and SingTel. 4 But Temasek
and other early SWFs also invested internationally for decades without
attracting adverse attention. This Section explores the changes in the
economic milieu and in the SWFs themselves that raised the profile of
SWFs.
The current high profile of SWFs is not explained by their size.
Compared to other large investors, SWFs are relatively insignificant.
38. See infra App. A.
39. For example, SWFs from Iran, Kazakhstan, Qatar, and Kuwait share this stated
goal. See id.
40. For example, SWFs from Alaska and Botswana share this goal. See id.
41. One such example is Vietnam's SWF. See id.
42. For example, SAFE and the State General Reserve Fund of Oman share this goal.
See id.
43. For example, SWFs from Azerbaijan, Brazil, Norway, China (CIC), and Abu
Dhabi (Mubadala) share this goal. See id.
44. "SingTel is the largest company listed on the Singapore Exchange with a market
capitalization of more than S$40 billion." See SingTel, Company Profile,
http://home.singtel.com/about-singtel/company-profile/default.asp (last visited Nov. 4,
2009).
20091
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Table 141
Hedge Funds $1.0
SWFs $ 3.8
Pension Funds $19
Insurance Co. $ 21
Mutual funds $ 22
Global GDP $ 61
(in trillions of U.S. dollars)
Table I reveals that while SWFs have some $3.8 trillion in assets under
management, pension funds worldwide have an estimated $19 trillion of
assets under management. Insurance companies have approximately $21
trillion in investable assets, and investment funds of all sorts manage an
estimated $22 trillion.
Notwithstanding the comparatively insignificant size of investable funds
controlled by SWFs, their sudden appearance in the equity markets and the
massive size of their individual investment positions has triggered concerns
in both the popular media and in the U.S. Congress. The unique
characteristic of a SWF investment is that it is controlled by a sovereign
whose true present and future investment intentions are unknown and
unknowable. The economic, diplomatic, and political interests of a
sovereign will almost always coincide with the goals of a SWF, but they
need not always do so. At times, diplomatic or political interests could
trump traditional investment goals. This lack of knowledge makes it
possible for Congress and the media to see SWFs as a threat.
In principle, SWF investments should be managed with a multi-year
horizon, with investments made for the long term, and with the goal of
wealth maximization within the fund. To date there is no evidence to
suggest that any SWF, no matter how opaque its operations, has acted in
any instance for political or diplomatic, or non-economic, purposes.46
45. Steffen Kern, Sovereign Wealth Funds: State Investments During the Financial
Crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK RES., July 15, 2009, at 1, 5, available at
http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR-INTERNETDE-PROD/PRODOOOOOOOOOO
244283.pdf. Table I is used with authorization from its Author. The figure for SWFs has
been updated with information from the SWF Institute to reflect SWF assets estimated as of
August 2009. See infra App A.
46. Justin O'Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct Investment and the Regulation
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, BERKLEY CENTER FOR L. & Soc'Y 10 (2008); Ashby H.B. Monk,
Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance, 13
(Working Paper, May 1, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/bastract=l 134862; Opinion of
the European Economic and Social Committee on 'The Impact of Private Equity, Hedge and
Sovereign Funds on Industrial Change in Europe,' T 5.6 (Oct. 15, 2006),
http://www.eesc.europa.eu ("There is no substantive evidence that SWFs make investments
for political or strategic motives.").
[Vol. 18:1
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Nearly every publicly-held enterprise welcomes passive long-term
investors. Any large investor could threaten an unwelcome change of
control. Typically this threat is a private matter between these parties and
of little interest to the government or the public. With SWFs, however, the
question is not simply whether the SWF is interested in gaining control of
an entity, but whether such an investor might one day use its influence or
outright control over an investee company to further the diplomatic policies
or political interests of the sovereign. After all, SWFs do not answer to or
seek investment funds from other investors. SWFs are ultimately
responsible to a sovereign with political and other interests.
Although lack of enforceable transparency rules makes this point
impossible to determine, SWFs traditionally sought to protect their cash
surpluses by investing in risk-free U.S. Treasury instruments. Treasury
bonds, bills, and notes, together with U.S. agency instruments,47 provided
the ultimate in financial security and stability for offshore and domestic
holders of the U.S. dollar. When a SWF invests in debt or equity
instruments issued by private or public companies, there is seldom an
obligation for them to disclose such investments. This is not a unique or
threatening feature of funds controlled by a foreign sovereign. It is also the
status of private investors.
We can better understand the sudden, recent rise to media and political
prominence of the SWFs when we consider three factors: (i) the rapid
growth of SWFs in the twenty-first century; (ii) the marked increased in
their publicly disclosed investments since 2004; and (iii) the low returns
available on U.S. Treasury and agency instruments over the last few years.
Two recently aborted investments focused public attention on SWFs.48
These affairs also contributed to the notoriety SWFs now have.
Chart I below, prepared by Steffen Kern at Deutsche Bank Research,
illustrates the phenomenal rise of SWF investments after 2003. Because
there are no mandatory disclosure rules applicable to SWFs, the data
utilized in this chart reflects only that small portion of SWF investments
that has become public. The lack of transparency of SWFs generally is not
limited to investments made or portfolio holdings. This absence of
verifiable data on SWFs as a category is complete.49 It applies to the overall
size of SWFs, portfolio allocations, their individual investment goals and
philosophies, historical investment performance, as well as other categories.
47. See infra note 51.
48. See infra text following note 66.
49. One of the more transparent SWFs is the Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation Pte Ltd ("GIC"). Its policy on disclosures is set forth in itsfirst annual report,
issued in 2008, twenty-seven years after it was created. "As the Government of Singapore is
the owner of the funds that GIC manages, we take our lead from the Government regarding
the disclosure of any information on the funds." GOV'T OF SING. INV. CORP., 2008 SUMMARY
ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2008).
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Nevertheless, Chart I starkly reveals another cause of the current focus on
SWFs.
Chart 150
Chart 1 reveals that from 1995 through 2003, known SWF investments
aggregated about $10 billion. Throughout this early period there are only
two years when these investments exceeded $1 billion. In 1999, it is
estimated that a total of $2 billion was invested by SWFs; in 2001, this
estimate is $4 billion. Dramatic changes appear after 2003, as SWFs
accumulated more assets and sought higher returns than those offered by
U.S. treasuries and related instruments. During 2004, the aggregate of all
known investments made by SWFs grew to $8 billion. These investments
jumped to $19 billion in 2005, $35 billion in 2006, $44 billion in 2007, and
50. Kern, supra note 45, at 13 (indicating that the information presented in Chart I is
based upon transactions occurring between 1995 and 2009 as reported by Dealogic involving
at least one state-sponsored investor on the acquirer side. The reported transactions are
likely to entail only a fraction of the transaction de facto undertaken by such vehicles, many
of which are not publically disclosed. The data presented here should, therefore, be
understood as tentative indicators of broad trends). Chart I is reprinted with the permission
of its Author.
Sovereign Investments Over Time
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$58 billion in 2008. This explosive growth explains, in part, the
significantly higher profile SWFs now have.
E. Explaining the Explosion in Disclosed Sovereign Wealth Fund
Investments
Two contributing factors explain this increase in disclosed investments:
(i) the unprecedentedly low rates of return offered by U.S. Treasury and
related instruments and (ii) the rapid accumulation of assets under
management by the SWFs. Until recently the typical investment for excess
dollar holdings of foreign nations was the safest and most secure
investments available: U.S. Treasuries or other instruments, such as those
issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), and certain
other government supported enterprises ("GSEs").5" The U.S. Federal
Reserve Board's Open Market Committee (colloquially referred to as the
"Fed") manages certain short term interest rates applicable to commercial
banks. The Fed sets the "discount rate, 52 the benchmark for many other
market-based interest rates in the United States. This discount rate was
lowered to combat the recession of 2001, and was then maintained by the
Fed at unusually low levels for several years as Chart 2 reveals.53 The
51. See, e.g., Foreign Holdings of U.S. Government Securities and the U.S. Current
Account: CBO Testimony before the U.S. House of Reps. Comm. on the Budget, June 26,
2007 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Dir., CBO),
http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/06.26orszag.pdf. The housing GSEs are the
twelve Federal Home Loan Banks; Federal National Mortgage Association; Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation; Government National Mortgage Association; Farming: Federal
Farm Credit Banks; and Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation. See Kevin R. Kosar,
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Government-Sponsored Enterprises
(GSEs): An Institutional Overview, RS21663, Apr. 23, 2007, at 3, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21663.pdf. Prior to September 2008, no GSE obligations
were directly supported by the U.S. Government. See Press Release, Statement by Secretary
Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect
Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp 1129.htm. The added risk from the lack of an outright
guarantee meant that such instruments returned a slightly higher yield. See Federal Subsidies
for the Housing GSEs: CBO Testimony before the U.S. House of Reps. Subcomm. on Fin.
Serv., May 23, 2001 (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Dir., CBO),
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/052301cr.pdf. Notwithstanding the lack of such
guarantee the investment community considered these agency instruments attractive because
of their higher yield and the assumption that they were backed by an "implicit" guarantee
from the U.S. Treasury. Id.
52. The Federal Reserve at times uses the term "discount rate" to mean the primary
credit rate. Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy, The Discount Rate,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
53. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Graph,
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[ 1 ] [id]=FEDFUNDS (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
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discount rate was later set even lower as the Fed battled the economic crisis
in 2008.
Chart 2
54
Effective Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS)
Source Board of Governo !, of the Federal Reserve System
7-
2 _ _
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Shaded areas indicate US reces-iins.
2009 research. stiouisfed org
These low Fed discount rates, in turn, meant that the investment return
on U.S. Treasury and related obligations was unusually low. Such low
returns logically led SWFs to seek for higher returns elsewhere. Higher
returns were available in equity interests in Western companies. The
chosen companies had to be large to absorb the SWFs' large investments
and thus were likely to have a high public profile.
A second factor contributing to the post-2003 investment surge shown in
Table I was a large increase in commodity prices. Chart 3" illustrates the
remarkable rise in the price of crude oil, which accounts for most of the
commodity funded SWFs. In the ten years from 1998 to 2007, crude oil
benchmark prices rose from less than $20 to more than $140 per barrel.56
54.
55.
56.
Cushing.
See infra Chart 3.
These prices are specifically for barrels of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) at
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Chart 357
U.S Dollars per Barrel Over Time
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There was no apparent end to this trend of rising crude oil prices in 2006.
With projections into the future of many more trillions soon to be held by
SWFs,"8 headline writers, movie producers, and other commercially-
motivated individuals announced that SWFs would shortly "own the
world!"
5 9
There is no consensus view of the total value of SWF assets. Different
estimates arise from the varying definitions of SWFs and the lack of
transparency of most of these funds.60 The International Monetary Fund
("IMF') estimated that SWFs' controlled assets valued at $500 billion in
1990.61 SWF assets doubled to $1 trillion by 2005.62 In mid-2009, the SWF
Institute estimated that the fifty-two funds it follows controlled assets
valued at $3.8 trillion.63  It was in this context that the commodity
exporting nations and Asian nations with large balance of trade surpluses
64
57. EIA, International Energy Price Information, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
international/prices.html#Crude (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
58. James Surowiecki, Sovereign Wealth World, NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2007,
http://www.newyorker.com/talklfinancial/2007/11 /26/071126ta talk surowiecki (estimating
that SWFs would be in control of $12 trillion in assets by 2015).
59. Supra notes 4-10.
60. See infra discussion in Part IV, The Santiago Principles.
61. Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 44 FIN. DEV. (2007),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight/htm.
62. Id.
63. See infra App. A.
64. Korea, Singapore, Japan, and China are some of those among the Asian nations
with trade balances. China was estimated to be increasing its foreign currency reserves by
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sought to increase the historically low returns on U.S. Treasuries and related
instruments.65
1. High Profile Investments
Public awareness of SWFs was also enhanced by two proposed
transactions that developed into center-ring attractions in media circuses.
The first was a transaction involving the Chinese National Offshore Oil
Company ("CNOOC") which hit the news in June 2005. CNOOC is not a
SWF, but the Chinese government owns 70% of it, and CNOOC is therefore
referred to as a state-owned enterprise ("SOE"). This ownership by China
is sufficient to perfect the analogy to a formal SWF and to the threat, if any,
posed by SWFs.6
Within weeks of the resolution of the CNOOC affair, a second
controversial transaction became public. Dubai Ports World ("DPW"), a
subsidiary of a SWF based in Dubai, stumbled into an inexplicable political
fight, best explained by the weakness of the Executive Branch and "the
exigencies of the electoral calendar, 67 rather than the substance of what
Congress claimed to have discovered. When the DPW affair subsided in the
spring of 2006, crude oil prices were still steadily climbing and the
supposed threat to the American way of life posed by these large
accumulations of U.S. dollars in the hands of foreigners was a common
theme heard by anyone exposed to the media.
2. CNOOC Unocal - Chevron
In 2005, CNOOC made an $18.5 billion offer for Unocal, a California-
based oil company.68 This offer to Unocal stockholders trumped an
outstanding $16 billion offer from Chevron Oil Company, also based in
California. The CNOOC bid enlivened politics and consumed the media for
weeks during the summer of 2005.
The New York Times reported: "The offer is . . . the latest symbol of
China's growing economic power and of the soaring ambitions of its
corporate giants, particularly when it comes to the energy resources it needs
$1 billion per day in 2007. Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, China's Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S.
Trade Policy, RL32165, Jan. 9, 2008, at 9, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32165.pdf.
65. See supra text accompanying note 47.
66. As one commentator has noted, in the end CNOOC is controlled by the Chinese
Communist Party. Jason Buhi, Negocio de China: Building upon the Santiago Principles to
Form an Effective International Approach to Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation, 39 H. K. L.
J. 197, 202 (2009).
67. O'Brien, supra note 50, at 1236.
68. Unocal was founded in 1890 as the Union Oil Company of California.
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desperately to continue feeding its rapid growth. 69 CNOOC said its offer
represents a premium of about $1.5 billion over the value of Unocal's deal
with Chevron after a $500 million breakup fee.70
The New York Times also reported that "Two Republican representatives
from California, Richard W. Pombo and Duncan Hunter, wrote a letter last
week to President Bush urging that the transaction be scrutinized on the
grounds of national security."7  The California politicians noted in their
letter to President Bush:
As the world energy landscape shifts, we believe that it is critical to
understand the implications for American interests and most especially,
the threat posed by China's governmental pursuit of world energy
resources. The United States increasingly needs to view meeting its energy
requirements within the context of our foreign policy, national security and
economic security agenda.
72
Reacting to the intensive media attention generated by its bid, CNOOC
promptly pledged to continue Unocal's practice of selling all of the oil and
gas Unocal produced in the United States to customers in the United
States.73
Facing a U.S. domestic political furor fed by Chevron lobbyists in
Washington and its public relations firms, CNOOC ultimately withdrew its
bid and issued the following statement: "The unprecedented political
opposition . . . was regrettable and unjustified . . . . This political
environment has made it very difficult for us to accurately assess our chance
of success, creating a level of uncertainty that presents an unacceptable risk
to our ability to secure this transaction. 74 Once the CNOOC threat had
69. David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil Giant in Takeover Bid for
U.S. Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06231
business/worldbusiness/23unocal.html?_r= 1.
70. Id.
A fee paid if a party voluntarily backs out of a deal to sell or
purchase a business or a business's assets. Termination fees are
usually negotiated and agreed on as part of corporate merger or
acquisition negotiations. The fee is designed to protect the
prospective buyer and to deter the target corporation from
entertaining bids from other parties.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 215, 1609 (8th ed. 2004) (directing readers to the definition of
"termination fee" in order to define "break-up fee").
71. Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Associated Press, China's CNOOC Drops Bid for Unocal: Chinese Oil Firm
Cites 'Political Environment' in the U.S., MSNBC, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/8795682/page/l/.
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been dealt with, Chevron completed its acquisition of Unocal, raising its bid
slightly.75
3. Dubai Ports World
Just a few months after the CNOOC threat to the American way of life
was eliminated in August 2005, another foreign threat appeared. Temasek, a
Singapore SWF, sought to buy the British ports operator, Peninsular and
Oriental Steam Navigation Company ("P&O"). Its offer for P&O, which
managed ports in eighteen countries, including six major East coast ports in
the United States,76 was ultimately topped by a bid from DPW. Once
Temasek withdrew from the bidding,77 DPW voluntarily notified CF1US 78
that it would acquire P&O. As is detailed in Part III of this Article, the
CFIUS process includes an initial thirty day review that is followed by a
more exhaustive forty-five day investigation if national security issues are
raised. 7
DPW fully briefed representatives of all of the CFIUS Executive Branch
agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and interested
national intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Following the initial
review, CFIUS approved DPW's acquisition of P&O.
80
At the end of 2005, confidence in President George W. Bush and the
Executive Branch was at a near record low as the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan grew more unpopular. Once members of Congress, ever-
cognizant of mid-term Congressional elections, became aware that CFIUS
had authorized the P&O acquisition, they did not miss the opportunity to
75. People's Daily Online, Unocal Reject CNOOC After Chevron Raises Takeover
Offer, July 21, 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/21/eng2005072 1_
197449.html. Chevron raised its offer from $16.5 billion to $17.1 billion, or $63 dollars per
share in cash and stock, and increased the cash portion to 40% from 25%. Id. Unocal's
board voted to accept Chevron's sweetened offer, and rejected a still higher all-cash offer
from CNOOC worth $67 dollars per share. Id. While CNOOC's offer was higher than
Chevron's, the Unocal Board of Directors recommended the Chevron transaction which was
approved by shareholders. Id.
76. Those six major East Coast ports are New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, New Orleans, and Miami. Press Release, Rosa L. DeLauro, Rep., U.S. House of
Representatives, DeLauro Co-Sponsors Legislation to Halt Dubai Port Deal (Feb. 22, 2006),
http://delauro.house.gov/release.cfmid=1212.
77. Rival Bows out of P&O Battle, BBC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4700144.stm.
78. See infra Part II, CFIUS procedures.
79. See infra Part II text accompanying notes 137, 139.
80. Patrick McGeehan, Despite Fears, A Dubai Company Will Help Run Ports In
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, http://www.nytimes.comV2006/02/17/
nyregion/17ports.html ("Stewart Baker, assistant secretary for policy at the Department of
Homeland Security, said his department had no information about Dubai Ports World that
justified an objection to the deal. Indeed, he said, the company has cooperated with the
department in its efforts to secure American ports and ships in foreign ports. 'We did not
find derogatory information in our review,' he said.").
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demonstrate their patriotism by opposing the acquisition. In what I
characterize as both politics as usual and Congressional racial profiling,
Democrats and Republicans denounced CFIUS for approving the DPW
transaction without a full investigation. These critics asserted that the
United Arab Emirates, of which Dubai is a member, was a state supporter of
terrorism.81
President Bush pointed out that port security was the responsibility of the
U.S. Coast Guard, Homeland Security, and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and that management of ports by P&O prior to or following a
sale to DPW would have no impact on the security of our ports.82 The
Administration explained that DPW had been the first Middle Eastern entity
to join the multinational Container Security Initiative, a program designed
to protect global trade from terrorism.83 The public was also informed that
Dubai had been the first to join the Department of Energy's Megaports
Initiative, a nuclear nonproliferation program aimed at stopping illicit
shipments of nuclear and radioactive material.84
Even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became involved in this
"perfect storm" of domestic politics. 8  Peter Pace, a Marine Corps four-star
general, dismissed the terror-link allegations. "In everything that we have
asked and worked with [the UAE] on, they have proven to be very, very
solid partners. 86
Once P&O shareholders approved the sale in early March, to assuage
fears generated by the politicians and the media, DPW voluntarily submitted
to the further forty-five day CFIUS investigation demanded by
Congressional critics, the very investigation CFIUS had determined was
unnecessary.87 The November elections were just seven months away, and
the House Appropriations Committee, apparently eager to demonstrate that
81. "Mr. Schumer said that he was concerned that the company could be infiltrated
by terrorists with designs on exploiting the vulnerability of American ports. He noted that
the September 11 attacks were financed in part by money that passed though banks in the
United Arab Emirates." Id.
82. Press Release, George W. Bush, Pres., White House Fact Sheet: The CFIUS
Process and the DP World Transaction (Feb. 22, 2006), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222- I .html.
83. The Initiative implemented information-sharing and scanning technologies, as
well as other administrative and technological methods, including pre-screening of
containers prior to shipment.
84. Nat'l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Megaports Initiative,
http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear-nonproliferation/164l.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
85. WILLIAM MIRACKY Er AL., ASSESSING THE RISKS: THE BEHAVIORS OF SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 18 (2008), http://www.altassets.com/
pdfs/MonitorSWFReport.pdf.
86. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, The United States-UAE Bilateral Relationship
(Feb. 23, 2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2006/61914.htm.
87. Press Release, DP World (Feb. 26, 2006), www.dpworld.com (follow "Media
Centre"; then follow "News Releases"; then follow "News Releases 2006"; then click on
hyperlink for Feb. 26 Press Statement).
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they could not be outmaneuvered by the unpopular President Bush, CFIUS,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and DPW, overwhelmingly approved a
legislative amendment prohibiting the DPW transaction. This action was
rendered veto-proof because it was attached to an appropriation of funds for
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.88 Claiming to enhance national security,
patriotic Members of Congress courageously jumped in where the War on
Terror President, multiple agencies of the Executive Branch, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no need to go. Thus, Congress
heroically acted to prohibit a change in management of U.S. ports from
"Brits" to "Arabs." "The two parties seemed to be more interested in
gaining recognition that their party was stronger on national security issues
than they were in learning the actual effects that the transaction would
produce. It was an election year after all." 89
F. Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in the 2007 Economic
Slowdown
The CNOOC and DPW affairs raised public awareness of SWF
investments. While we do know of the recent increase in investments by
SWFs in public companies, we know very little about any other investments
by SWFs. If we accept the estimate of $3.8 trillion as the size of SWF
investable assets in mid-2009 and the projection of $1 trillion as the annual
rate of increase of SWF assets in future years, 90 there can be no doubt that
the SWFs lack of transparency hides a great deal. As the economic crisis
began to develop at the close of 2006 and early in 2007, the problem of how
SWFs could earn acceptable returns on their ever-increasing amounts of
investable funds remained.
The subprime mortgage crisis became apparent in the United States in
early 2007. U.S. housing prices had stopped rising at their unprecedented
pace of the previous few years, and the market for securitized mortgages
and other derivative instruments created from mortgages and mortgage
derivatives that had been marketed as risk-free, collapsed. The world's
largest commercial and investment banks, having fully imbibed the
intoxicating, virtually risk free securitized mortgage instruments Wall Street
alchemists had concocted, found that at that moment these securities had
little market value. This collapse in value created a desperate need for bank
capital. The somnolent regulatory agencies of the leading developed
nations made the same discovery at this time. As had happened in earlier
banking crises, bank regulators could not or would not close these
88. House Panel Votes to Block Ports Deal, Fox NEWS, Mar. 9, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,187147,00.html.
89. Waseam Azmeh, Sovereign Wealth Funds (Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author at MSU College of Law).
90. Surowiecki, supra note 58.
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institutions. They had become undercapitalized by tens of billions but were
considered "too big to fail."
SWFs were well positioned to be the source of the required additional
bank capital. Faced with the need for increasing the return on their
portfolios, SWF managers understood the opportunity presented by the
banks' predicament: banks were under regulatory pressure to offer favorable
terms to secure such investments, and the SWFs had the cash. Investing in
the world's leading banks would give participating SWFs new credibility
and stature in the global financial community. What could be more
attractive than an investment in the premier financial institutions in the
world's largest, most successful economies? Equity investments in
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Standard
Chartered Bank, and UBS provided quite favorable returns, especially in
light of the rate of return available on U.S. Treasuries and related
instruments. The fact that the U.S. Government and other leading nations
had, explicitly or implicitly, deemed these institutions "too big to fail"9' was
an important added bonus. The cash-gorged SWFs did not miss this
opportunity to take supposedly ultra-safe positions in financial institutions,
which had been household names for generations. The investments in
western money center financial institutions set out in Table 2 are indicative
of the opportunities seized by the SWFs.
Table 292
Financial Institution Billions Invested by all SWFs
Deutsche Bank $ 1.8
Standard Chartered $ 4
Morgan Stanley $ 5
Merrill Lynch $ 6.4
Citigroup $17.5
UBS $24.2
91. Patrice Hill, Citigroup, Other Banks in Trouble, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2O08/nov/21/citigroup-other-banks-in-new-
trouble/print/ ("While the banks' woes are real and growing, Mr. Beales[, an investment
analyst,] said the drubbing of bank shares this week has been overdone. 'It's highly unlikely
that the end game for Citi or its big rivals is collapse,' he said. 'They remain too big to
fail."').
92. See Kern, supra note 45; MONITOR GROUP, supra note 22.
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G. Financial Crisis: Sovereign Wealth Funds Stabilize Financial
Institutions
Through the first months of 2008, the financial community, the business
press, and government officials dealt with the instability in the global
banking system as merely the most recent, although perhaps more severe,
version of prior episodes of banking instability brought on by real estate
related problems. Parallels were drawn to the savings and loan problems in
the United States in the late 1980s. The trigger for bank losses this time
was subprime mortgages, which had been packaged and repackaged as
securitized investments, and which the banks had purchased in the search
for higher yields and larger personal paydays.
H. Mortgage Problems Become a Crisis
Concern about the stability of banks and the international financial
system developed during 2007 and grew more serious in early 2008. In
mid-March 2008, however, the global economy began to change for the
worst. Bear Stearns, Wall Street's fifth largest investment bank, which, like
many other financial institutions, had been funding its capital needs in the
very liquid overnight-borrowing market, suddenly became a pariah to
lenders. On Monday, March 10, a rumor spread that Bear Stearns was in
trouble, and by Thursday, March 13, more than $15 billion in hedge fund
prime brokerage accounts had been withdrawn from the firm.93  This
quickly led to disaster. Bear Stearns suddenly found it nearly impossible to
rollover its overnight borrowings. An emergency rescue of Bear Stearns
was arranged by federal authorities over the March 15-16 weekend.
JPMorgan Chase, the one major bank not threatened by high exposure to the
subprime mortgage problems plaguing the industry, with $30 billion in
support from the Federal Reserve Bank, acquired Bear Stearns for $2 per
share.94
The economic crisis continued to deteriorate over the next six months.
On September 8, 2008, the world learned of the demise of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. 95 Seven days later, Lehman Brothers96 filed for bankruptcy
93. Steven M. Davidoff & Daniel Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 463, 473-83 (2009).
94. Within days the acquisition price was increased to $10 per share. For the
fascinating story of the reasons for this increase see STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS OF WAR
145-46(2009).
95. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2301-
04, 122 Stat. 2805 (2008) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase securities
and other obligations of these mortgage funders) (Act was passed on Aug. 27, 2008).
96. Lehman Brothers faced huge losses arising out of the subprime mortgage crisis.
In the first half of 2008, Lehman stock lost almost 75% of its value. However, on August 22,
shares in Lehman closed up sharply on reports that the Korea Development Bank was
considering buying the failing bank. However, when the Korea Development Bank did not
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protection, and the true condition of American International Group, Inc.,
which by 2009 had received more than $160 billion in federal rescue
support, became public.
III. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICA: ESSENTIAL FOR THREE
CENTURIES
Foreign investment is a vital component of American prosperity. This
began in 1607 when shareholders of the Virginia Company sent settlers to
Jamestown in the New World in search of wealth. Foreign nations funded
the American Revolution out of political and commercial rivalry with Great
Britain. The Bank of the United States was 62% owned by foreigners in
1803. European debt and equity investments greatly accelerated the
development of our railroads and created many mining, meatpacking, and
other industries in the nineteenth century.
The long history of foreign investment in the United States includes
many federal laws restricting foreign investment. Early examples are the
1841 Preemption Act 98 and the 1872 Mining Act,99 which reflect attempts to
regulate the settlement of the vast open lands west of the Appalachians.
They were not a response to national security threats to a nation protected
by thousands of miles of ocean. Such restrictions did little to reduce foreign
investment. 0°
Limitations on foreign investment accelerated in the twentieth century.
Congress enacted the Pickett Act in 1909 to limit foreign claims on western
oil-producing land. 10' In 1912, Congress authorized the president to restrict
foreign investment in the fledgling radio industry." 2 In the midst of World
consummate the acquisition, Lehman shares collapsed again. The situation with Lehman
grew worse on September 9, 2008, when the Dow Jones industrial average lost 300 points
partly due to fears over the fate of Lehman. In addition, even though the U.S. government
had previously arranged the rescue of Bear Stearns and had just bailed out Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae by announcing hundreds of billions of dollars in support from the U.S. Treasury,
the government determined not to assist Lehman. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 93.
97. SAMUEL BLODGET, ECONOMICA: A STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 198 (1806).
98. Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453, 455-56 (repealed in 1891).
99. The 1872 Federal Mining Act intended to add incentive to exploration of western
lands by creating a claim-patent process for land acquisition. The Act added "proof of
citizenship" as a part of the process, although that seems to have been meant to incentivize
Americans to set up companies for foreign investment. General Mining Act of 1872 30
U.S.C. §§ 22-47 (2006).
100. GAO, supra note 23, at 18.
101. Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (repealed in 1943).
102. President Woodrow Wilson seized control over all U.S. foreign-owned radio
stations in 1917 under the Radio Act of 1912. Later, the General Electric Company spun-off
the Radio Corporation of America which had been formed as a domestic monopoly at the
urging of the U.S. Navy. EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 10 (2006).
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War I, President Woodrow Wilson seized control of foreign-owned radio
stations. 10
3
In 1920, Congress enacted the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, which limited
a foreign oil company's ability to drill in the United States by requiring
them to lease the land from the Government.'O° After World War II, with
Europe's capital base destroyed, the United States became the major source
of global investment capital. As Europe and Japan gradually became more
prosperous, the thriving American consumer economy attracted increasing
amounts of foreign investment.
A. The Impact of Recent International Developments
The oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries ("OPEC") in 1973 introduced a totally new category of investor.
The embargo resulted in a significant increase in the price of crude oil,
which resulted in a major transfer of wealth to OPEC members, particularly
in the Middle East. These "petro-dollars" were recycled by their new
owners back to the oil importing industrialized nations, especially the
United States, where most funds were invested in traditional "risk-free"
U.S. Treasury and related instruments. Though the 1973 oil embargo
stimulated public discussion about the threat to America from the
accumulation of dollars in the OPEC countries, the petro-dollars invested in
the United States were not viewed as a threat. There was no indication that
Middle Eastern investors intended to buy control of American companies.
Public attention focused on the unfamiliar concept of foreigners having
enormous amounts of investable dollars. It was assumed that these
foreigners had the same investment goals as other investors: an increase in
wealth.
A further wave of foreign investment occurred in the early 1980s. A
portion of this investable cash derived from a second abrupt increase in the
cost of crude oil triggered by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. A new
and different foreign investment threat from Asia emerged shortly
thereafter.
By 1980 Japan had fully recovered from the devastation of World War
II, and in the late 1980s Japan modified its Foreign Exchange Control Law
to permit Japanese citizens and companies to invest abroad more easily.'15
Over the next decade the Japanese yen strengthened against the U.S. dollar,
making investments in the U.S. economy very attractive for Japanese
investors. By 1989, Japanese direct and portfolio investments accounted for
103. See Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, § 2, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927).
104. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2009).
105. See Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, http://www.japanlaw.
info.forexlaw/JS.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
[Vol. 18:1
HeinOnline -- 18 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 88 2009-2010
Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds
17% of all foreign investment in the United States. °6 Japanese investments
were sometimes large; some were quite conspicuous."°7 The appearance of
these large pools of foreign capital in the Middle East and Japan generated
concern in the United States over foreign investment that remains strong
today.
B. The Modem Approach to Investment by Foreign Investors
The United States has enjoyed the benefits of foreign investment'0 8 and
has consistently espoused openness toward investments by foreigners.1
The restrictions U.S. policy imposed on foreign investment were directed,
until recently, at specific categories of activities and assets."0  Such
restrictions were rooted in protecting investment opportunities for
Americans, not the perception that our national security could be threatened
by foreign investors.
More recently, policy concerns have focused upon a concern for national
security. Earlier restrictions targeted foreigners as a broad category and did
not focus on the unique characteristics of particular types of foreign
investors. U.S. legislators previously assumed, without analysis, that
foreign investors were rational economic actors, seeking maximum returns
from their investments in the United States. The U.S. economic regulatory
framework has been based upon the nature of the investment to be made,
not upon the character of the foreign investor."' We have assumed that
investors seek wealth maximization. An unstated assumption has been that
all market participants, including foreigners, invest solely to increase their
own wealth. The increased investment activity of SWFs and SOEs"l2 has
led to a reconsideration of this assumption.
106. Mira Wilkins, Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change,
1879-1990, 64 Bus. HIST. REV. 585, 610 (1990).
107. Pebble Beach Golf Course and Rockefeller Center in New York City are
prominent examples of high profile investments, perhaps chosen specifically because they
were high profile.
108. GAO, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN 10 COUNTRIES, GAO-08-320, (2008) (stating that other nations too have these
restrictions). Indeed, the United States is ranked relatively high on the list of nations and
their openness to foreign investment. Id.
109. See George W. Bush, Pres., State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004),
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/sou/index.htmil.
110. GAO, supra note 23.
111. Lawrence Summers, Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism, FIN. TIMES,
July 30, 2007, http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforuml2007/07/sovereign-fundshtml/.
112. See supra Part II.A.
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C. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
CF1US is the backbone of America's legislative efforts to protect the
nation from any risk arising from foreign investments. The current CF1US
process has evolved over more than three decades of practice and
intermittent review of its authority and procedures."1 3
1975 - The Establishment of CFIUS
At the height of the first OPEC oil embargo in 1974, Congress mandated
a study to investigate direct and portfolio investments in the United States
by foreign persons and entities." 4  The following year President Gerald
Ford signed an Executive Order" 5 establishing an Executive Branch
committee to review certain investments in the United States by foreign
investors. The focus was the risk presented by control of U.S companies by
foreigners; there was no explicit concern about direct or indirect control of
American businesses by foreign governments. The government entity
responsible for reviewing investments by foreigners was and remains
CFIUS. This Committee operates almost totally outside the public arena,
but we do have some perspective on the level of CFIUS activity." 6 In 2006,
there were approximately 10,000 merger transactions in the United States.
Of these, 1730 involved a foreign party, but only 113 required review by
CFIUS. According to Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Kimmitt,
not one of these CFUS-reviewed transactions was blocked. 1
7
1988 - The Exon-Florio Amendment
CF1US operated pursuant to President Ford's Executive Order for more
than a decade. During the 1980's, protection of American technology
companies became a national security concern. In 1988, Congress amended
the Defense Production Act of 1950 by enacting the Exon-Florio
Amendment," 8 which empowered the President to investigate "mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers" that would result in a foreign person achieving
control over a company or business".9 where such control would impair
national security. Implementation and enforcement of Exon - Florio was
delegated to CFIUS. 1
20
113. While CFIUS has been a distinctly American response and is the focus of this
Article, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for a CFIUS-like structure for the EU.
Germany and France already have similar legislation in place.
114. Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974).
115. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975).
116. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
117. Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth and
the World Economy, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 123 (2008).
118. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
119. 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.302(b)(4), (e) (2009).
120. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1998) (designating CFIUS
responsible for the implementation of the new Exon-Florio statute).
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1993 - The Byrd Amendment
Congressional concern that the Committee was not being aggressive about
protecting American security led Senator Robert Byrd to propose new
amendments to CFIUS authority. The Byrd Amendment, enacted as section
837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993,
changed Section 721 of the Defense Production Act. 12' The change required
an investigation in cases where the acquirer is controlled by or acting on
behalf of a foreign government and the acquisition "could result in control
of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. that could affect the
national security of the [United States]."'22
2007 - FINSA
In addition to the CNOOC and DPW transactions, 123 there have been four
recent additional proposed acquisitions that involved issues of national
security but did not attract intense media attention. These additional
transactions were:
* The sale of Tyco International's undersea fiber-optic cable network
to an Indian firm; 4
* The Chinese computer company Lenovo's purchase of IBM's
personal computer business;
* The proposed acquisition of a small internet security business,
Sourcefire, Inc., by Check Point, an Israeli company, which did not
proceed after an announcement that CFIUS opposed the
transaction;' 25 and
121. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
122. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2)(J) (amended by
Pub. L. No.110-49, 121 Stat. 247 (2007)).
123. See infra Parts II.E.2-3.
124. In April 2005, CFIUS cleared the acquisition of Tyco International's undersea
fiber-optic cable network by Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd., an Indian firm. Videsh apparently
agreed to data security guidelines with U.S. law enforcement and defense agencies as a
condition of approval. Leon B. Greenfield, The CFIUS Process: A Primer, THE THRESHOLD,
(Winter 2005/2006), at 9.
125.
Security company Check Point Software Technologies called off its
planned $225 million acquisition of intrusion-prevention firm
Sourcefire on Thursday, a week before a federal watchdog was
scheduled to release a report which insiders say would have blocked
the merger on the grounds of national-security interests .... The
proposed Check Point acquisition was under initial review by the
U.S. Treasury-led CFIUS, when the Associated Press broke the news
that United Arab Emirates-based Dubai World Ports planned to close
a deal which would have given the company responsibility for
security at six major U.S. ports. The further investigation by CFIUS
into Check Point's proposed purchase of Sourcefire was announced
the following day.
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* The acquisition of Sequoia Voting Systems, America's third largest
manufacturer of electronic voting machines, by Smartmatic, a
company indirectly controlled by the Government of Venezuela,
without CF1US review.1
26
Congress was spurred to take action by these four transactions, the
CNOOC and DPW affairs, and the hundreds of billions of dollars that
continued to accumulate in SWFs, both in the Middle East, from the ever-
increasing price of crude oil, and in Asia, from the balance of trade
surpluses fed by debt-addicted American consumers' insatiable appetite for
more goods. Congressional options included legislation that reduced
America's consumption of imported oil, addiction to consumer debt, or
both. Congress, however, preferred to focus on where the SWFs were
investing, rather than on the unsustainable outflow of dollars. In 2007
Congress enacted the Foreign Investment and National Security Act'27
("FINSA"), which mandated new standards designed to bring CF1US
investment review procedures under more direct Congressional oversight.
On behalf of the Committee, the Treasury Department issued final
implementing regulations on November 14, 2008. On December 8, 2008,
the Department of the Treasury's Office of Investment Security published
Robert Lemos, Check Point Calls off Sourcefire Buy, SECURITYFOCuS, Mar. 24, 2006,
http://secuirtyfocus.com/news/ 1382.
126.
[In November 2007], Sequoia Voting Systems, the nation's third-
largest electronic voting machine maker, announced that the
company had been sold to private U.S. investors. This would be an
unremarkable transaction except that the seller, Smartmatic
Corporation, is a Venezuelan-owned company close to the
government of Hugo Chavez. And the sale was forced by a belated
investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS). But for the unprecedented unwinding of
Smartmatic's ownership - which almost did not happen - Chdvez
would be in a position to influence the outcome of next year's
presidential election.... CFIUS opened an investigation only after
Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), who chairs the subcommittee
overseeing CFIUS and who co-authored FINSA, wrote a letter to
then-Treasury Secretary John Snow inquiring whether the
Venezuelan government could use Sequoia to manipulate U.S.
elections. Maloney cited the fact that the Venezuelan state had
invested in Smartmatic's affiliates, the company's current ownership
was buried in a labyrinth of offshore trusts, and revelations that
Sequoia had flown fifteen Venezuelan nationals to Chicago to
tabulate votes in a local election.
Richard Brand & Ilya Shapiro, A Step in the Right Direction, WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 19,
2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/ContentlPublic/Articles/000%5C00%5COI4%
5C494abixg.asp.
127. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Public L. No. 110-49,
121 Stat. 246 (2007) (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. App. 2170(0 (2007)).
[Vol. 18:1
HeinOnline -- 18 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 92 2009-2010
Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds
"Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.' ' 128 CFIUS now
operates as prescribed by FINSA.
1. CFIUS Membership
CFIUS membership, as established by the statute, consists of the heads of
several Executive Branch departments and offices. These are the
Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of State, and the
Department of Energy. The Treasury Secretary serves as the chair of
CFIUS. In addition, two agencies have membership as non-voting, ex-
officio members. Those are the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Labor. Other heads of agencies, departments, or offices may
be added as the President deems appropriate. 129
2. CFIUS Transactions
CFIUS is charged with reviewing and reporting to Congress on any
proposed "covered transaction". A "covered transaction" is any transaction
that "could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States by a foreign government.'
130
CFIUS retains the flexibility to determine control on a case by case
basis. Will control be found if the foreigner does not have a majority of the
board of directors or the formal right to nominate candidates for board and
executive positions? How should convertible securities be handled? What
if the SWF is the principal creditor of a debt-strapped defense contractor?
There is no end to the variations and perturbations careful lawyers may
propose as parties attempt to arrange the best possible positions for their
clients while not triggering the murky CFIUS standards. The lack of a
bright line definition of control is no accident. Any competent lawyer can
work around a clear, bright line test. As Paul Rose has observed: "The
uncertainty of the rules' application will likely encourage SWFs to maintain
their shareholding strategy of passivity and understated influence."'
' 3
'
128. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the CFIUS, 73
Fed. Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800).
129. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2)(J).
130. Id. at app. § 2170(a)(3).
131. See Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Active or Passive Investors?, 11 8 YALE
L. J. 104 (Pocket Part 2008). To date, SWF investments have been carefully arranged so as
not to trigger reporting and review thresholds of other U.S. legislation. Id. As one example,
SWF investments in financial institutions have been "passive" and have been kept below the
I 0%t reporting threshold of the Bank Holding Company Act. Id.
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FINSA has expanded CFIUS' scope of authority by specifying that the
term "national security" includes issues relating to "homeland security;"'
13 2
defining "homeland security" to include America's "critical
infrastructure;"'133 and providing that the term "critical infrastructure"
encompasses "critical technologies", which term encompasses "technology,
components[,] or items essential to national defense."' 34
Another series of issues is presented by the CFIUS element of acting "on
behalf of a foreign government." Exactly when is a nominally private entity
or party to be considered acting on behalf of a foreign sovereign? Russian
oligarchs, fabulously wealthy individuals and families from the United Arab
Emirates or Saudi Arabia, and Chinese SOEs are just a few examples of this
fertile area of CFIUS ambiguity.
In contrast to this ambiguity, the regulations do make one thing clear, a
10% or smaller holding of voting shares exempts a transaction from CFIUS
review. 135
3. CFIUS Procedures
The formal CFIUS process has four steps. The initial phase is notice to the
Committee by the companies involved disclosing that a transaction is being
considered. The notice must include a description of the business that the
domestic company does with U.S. Government agencies, if such business
has possible national security ramifications.136  Second, a thirty-day
"National Security Review"' 137 is then conducted under the direction of a
lead Executive Branch department designated by CFIUS. This review
determines whether there are national security concerns.' 38 If national
security concerns are identified or if the transaction is foreign government
controlled and the parties wish to continue with the transaction, the
Committee conducts a forty-five day investigation into the national security
concerns as the third step of the process. 39 As a practical matter, CFIUS
may negotiate mitigation agreements and arrangements to satisfy the
Committee that U.S. security interests will continue to be protected. Such
agreements may include ongoing covenants and obligations that can be later
enforced by CF1US. Finally, CFIUS issues a recommendation proposing "a
Presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the acquisition." 140
132. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(5).
133. Id. app. § 2170(a)(5)-(6).
134. Id. app. § 2170(a)(7).
135. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2009).
136. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(3)(C).
137. Id. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
138. Id. app. § 2170(b)(l)(B).
139. Id. app. § 2170(b)(2)(B)-(C).
140. Id. app. § 2170(d)(i).
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In reviewing a covered transaction that has national security
implications, CFIUS considers a broad range of issues, including an
extensive list of "national security factors" taken from the Defense
Production Act.' 4' These "national security factors" include:
* Domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements;
* The capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services;
* Control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens
as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the
requirements of national security;
" The possible effects of the transaction on sales of military goods,
equipment, or technology to a country that the Secretary of State has
identified as supporting terrorism or as being of concern regarding
proliferation of missiles or chemical and biological weapons; to a country
that the Secretary of Defense has identified as posing a potential regional
military threat to the interests of the United States; or to a country listed on
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special Country List14 2 or any successor list;
* The potential effects of the transaction on U.S. international technological
leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security:'
43
141. Id. app. § 2170(f).
142. Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special Country List, 15 C.F.R. § 778, supp. 4
(1996). It should be noted, however, that this section was moved to 15 C.F.R. § 7988A,
supp. 4 later in 1996 before being removed entirely, effective December 31, 1996. See
Simplification of Export Administration Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12714 (Mar. 25, 1996)
(made effective Nov. 1, 1996).
143. Critical sectors of technological leadership include:
I. Advanced Materials and Processing
.1 Processes for Super Alloys, Polymers, etc.
1.2 Semiconductor Materials
1.3 Ceramics
1.4 Fiber-reinforced Composites and Metal Matrix Composites
1.5 Super Alloys
1.6 Polymeric Materials, Plastic Fabricators, Homogenous Injections, Extrusions
1.7 Energetic Materials (explosives, propellants, etc.)
1.8 Metamaterials (nanostructures with special properties)
2. Chemicals
3. Advanced Manufacturing
4. Information Technology
5. Telecommunications
6. Microelectronics
7. Semiconductor Fabrication Equipment
8. Electronics: Military Related
9. Biotechnology
10. Professional and Scientific Instruments
1 1. Aerospace and Surface Transportation
12. Energy
13. Space Systems
14. Marine Systems
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* The potential national security-related effects on U.S. critical
infrastructure, 144 including major energy assets;
" The potential national security-related effects on U.S. critical
technologies; 1
45
* Whether the covered transaction is a foreign government controlled
transaction 146 that could result in the control of a U.S. business by a foreign
government or an entity controlled or acting on behalf of a foreign
government;
" A review of the current assessment of the adherence of the subject country
to nonproliferation control regimes; the relationship of such country with
the United States, specifically in its record on cooperating in count-
terrorism efforts; and the potential for transshipment of diversion of
technologies with military applications, including an analysis of national
export control laws and regulations;
* The long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of energy and
other critical resources and materials; and
* Such other factors as the President or the Committee may determine to be
appropriate, generally, or in connection with a specific review or
investigation.
147
IV. THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES
FINSA was the Congressional reaction to the perceived threat from the
increase in size and impact of SWF investments in the United States. Other
nations were also concerned. The OECD, representing most developed
nations, also considered the challenge posed by this new, uncomprehended
threat. OECD concerns were similar to those expressed in the United
States. The large pools of SWF investable cash under the control and
management of other nations present the risk that SWFs might not always
act like private investors. 148 This concern is not irrational, but presents a
serious issue for responsible leaders of all nations. There is the possibility
that critical domestic economic resources might come under the control of
SWFs or SOEs that could have political purposes or goals different from
those of traditional private investors. OECD concerns have focused on the
2008 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S. ANN. REP. 39 (2008).
144. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(6) (defining "critical infrastructure" as "systems and
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on national
security.").
145. Id. app. § 2071(a)(7) (providing that "critical technologies" include "critical
technology, critical components, or critical technology items essential to national defense.").
146. Id. app. § 2170(0(8).
147. Id. app. § 2170(0(11).
148. See generally Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater
Transparency and Accountability, PERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. I (Aug. 2007)
(highlighting the fact that SWFs have the potential to complicate the thin line between public
and private investment policy).
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opacity of SWFs with respect to their investment goals, current plans, and
ownership details.
Early in 2008, the OECD prompted the IMF to take action. The IMF
cooperated with a group of twenty-six leading SWFs in organizing the 1WG
of SWFs. The 1WG mission was to prepare guidance that would allay the
concerns of investee nations with respect to SWF investment activities. 4 9
By October 2008, the IWG produced its 24 Generally Accepted Principles
and Practices. 5° The GAPP was intended "to identify [a] framework of
generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate
governance and accountability arrangements."''
The GAPP, also known as the "Santiago Principles," are informative and
reassuring to read, but as a document drafted by representatives of
sovereign nations, they have absolutely no binding force and carry no
meaningful weight. As the 1WG itself makes perfectly clear in its formal
Introduction to the GAPP: "The GAPP is a voluntary set of principles and
practices that the members of the IWG support and have either implemented
or aspire to implement."'
' 52
The GAPP and this work of the IWG in coordination with the OECD and
TMF need not be ignored. Neither should it be relied upon. The Santiago
Principles have not had, and will not have, any meaningful, substantive
impact on SWFs or their investments. Each of the 24 principles set forth in
the GAPP uses the verb "should." These principles do not relieve the
concerns of those who perceive a threat from SWFs."' While the dialog
may have made SWF managers more aware of the concerns of investee
states, the GAPP does not eliminate the risk that a SWF might use its
investment power to act against the interests of another nation. So long as
149. INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES"
28-31 (Oct. 2008), http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf (providing a list
of IWG Countries, SWFs, and institutions that participated in the IWG meetings). See infra
App. B.
150. There are in fact 24 Santiago Principles. See generally Santiago Principles,
supra note 149. Only the hypothetical introducing this Article has a GAPP 25.
151. See for example GAPPs 5, 11, 12, 17, 20. Id. See infra App. B.
152. Santiago Principles, supra note 149, at 5 (emphasis added).
153. Indeed some commentators have derided the entire effort, perhaps losing focus
on the inescapable reality of what "sovereign" means.
What is disappointing is [thel utter ineffectiveness of the GAPP
regime. The Principles accomplish nothing but a reiteration of the
least common denominators of the status quo. It seems that the
representatives of the Western free markets, in various states of
dependency and desperation, suspended their reservations about the
creeping resurgence of authoritarian capitalism to satisfy their
national thirsts for liquidity.
Buhi, supra note 66, at 198.
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the word "sovereign" retains its current meaning,'54 the risk presented by
SWFs cannot be eliminated by proclaimed principles, or even promises
made by entities that are ultimately instrumentalities of sovereign polities.
V. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
One of the principal complaints the OECD investee nations have about
SWFs is their near total lack of transparency. Some opacity is typical of
institutional investors. For example, hedge funds are extremely protective
of their financial privacy; they claim secrecy is vital to their trading
strategies. Investment companies that manage mutual funds and public
employee retirement funds do disclose details of their portfolio holdings and
investment performance, and they are required to undergo regular,
independent audits.
SWFs, on the other hand, as creatures of sovereign governments are free
to do almost anything they like. As Victor Fleischer has detailed, because
they are owned by a sovereign government, SWFs are not even taxed by the
Internal Revenue Service on their U.S. investment earnings or gains.
155
Speaking of his SWF's transparency, the Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of China's CIC said of the IWG's GAPP: "We will increase
transparency without harming the commercial interests of CIC. That is to
say, it will be a gradual process .... If we are transparent on everything,
the wolves will eat us up.'
156
For all but a very few SWFs 57 there is no official, independently audited
information on their investments. Verifiable details on total assets,
investment philosophy and goals, portfolio allocation, or investment
performance are simply not available. 158  Accordingly, an exhaustive
154. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (defining sovereign as an "entity
'in which independent and supreme authority is vested'); U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, http://travel.state.govlaw/info/judicial/judicial_693.html#
(explaining that under a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, a state or state
instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state, except with
respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on by private
persons). Black's Law Dictionary defines sovereignty as, "The power to do everything in a
state without accountability,. . . to make war or peace, to form treaties of alliance or of
commerce with foreign nations, and the like." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (7th
ed. 1999).
155. Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440,
445 (2009).
156. China Investment Corp. Warns Western Governments Against Protectionism,
FORBES, Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.forbes.comfeeds/afx/2007/12/10/afx4424545.html.
157. For example, Norway, Alaska, Alabama, Wyoming, and New Mexico.
Sovereign Wealth Institute, Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, http://www.swf
institute.org/research/transparencyindex.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
158. The SWFs of Norway and New Zealand do provide much more information than
other SWFs. Nevertheless, SWFs argue, as do hedge funds, that business operating
information must not be made available since this disadvantages the fund.
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examination of the actual performance of SWFs and their behavior in the
recent economic chaos is not possible. But it is useful to review how the
SWFs reacted to the worst decline in the equity markets since the Great
Depression. The analysis that follows reveals that despite unprecedented,
multi-billion dollar losses, SWFs have not panicked and sold their worst
performing holdings. Indeed, the evidence we have confirms that, to date,
SWFs have behaved as long-term, wealth-maximizing private investors.
The long-term nature of SWF investments is confirmed by some
remarkable statistics in the Deutsche Bank Report. Over the fifteen years
included in the Deutsche Bank SWF database, the gross value of all
divestitures has been a modest $46 billion. 59 With current SWF assets
between $3 trillion and $4 trillion,' 6° this is a telling data point. Many
privately managed U.S. funds have 100% or higher turnover annually. In
this light the Deutsche Bank figure, amounting to less than 1.5% of current
SWF assets over a fifteen-year period is astounding. 61  This data
persuasively establishes that SWFs have acted like long-term private
investors, not hostile nations seeking to damage the economies of its
enemies or pursuing commercial advantage for its own businesses.
62
An analysis of transactions completed by one group of SWFs was
published by the combined resources of the Monitor Company Group LP
and the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, an Italian economic research
institute. Monitor-FEEM identifies seventeen SWFs that meet its narrow
definition of SWF. 16 3 They tracked 1,158 of the transactions these funds
have completed since 1995.' 64 In April, 2009, Monitor-FEEM published its
first annual report (the "2008 SWF Annual Report") summarizing the
activities of this subset of SWFs during 2008.165 Selected data from the
2008 SWF Annual Report reveal that from January, 2007 to July, 2008,
eight of the leading SWFs invested $63.1 billion in six of the world's largest
159. Kern, supra note 45, at 30.
160. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND ASSET
ALLOCATION 2009 SPECIAL REPORT 17-18 (2009).
161. We do need to keep in mind that there is little available data on the actual
performance of sovereign wealth funds, including data on total portfolio allocation among
various asset classes or investment portfolio turnover. We do not know, for example, what
portion of the $3.8 trillion or so of SWF assets is invested in equities, and we have no data on
turnover in the non-public portions of these portfolios.
162. Bader Al Sa'ad, managing director of the Kuwait Investment Authority, noted his
SWFs' long-term focus at Davos in January 2008: "Kuwait has been a Daimler shareholder
since 1968 . . . [and a] BP shareholder since 1986. We are one of the most stable
shareholders of these companies." Joanne Baynham, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Friend or
Foe, I MILTON ASSET MGMT 1, 1-2 (2008).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Veljko Fotak, Hui Li, & Bill Megginson, Sovereign Wealth Fund Losses in
Listed Firm Stock Investments, in WEATHERING THE STORM: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 2008 53 (Bernardo Bortolotti & William Miracky eds.,
Monitor Group & Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2009).
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financial institutions 166 in twelve separate transactions. 167 By March, 2009,
this aggregate $63.1 billion investment had been reduced by the collapse of
global equity markets to $17.6 billion. 168  Few categories of legitimate
investments have lost 70% in value in so short a time.
Deutsche Bank Research provides a different source of SWF
performance data with comparable findings. It has been tracking SWFs and
providing performance updates for several years. 69 Table 2 is based upon
this Deutsche Bank data. Of the SWF investments in financial institutions
included in Table 2, the two worst performers for the extremely short period
of the current economic crisis are Merrill Lynch, where investors could
have incurred a maximum potential loss of 85%, and Citigroup, where the
maximum possible loss was 96%.
Other staggering losses suffered by SWFs include CIC's ten percent
stake in The Blackstone Group L.P., purchased with a much publicized $3
billion investment in April 2007. This investment was valued at less than
$1 billion in mid-2009. 70  A Dubai SWF invested $5.5 billion in MGM
Mirage, a casino and hotel operator, with stock purchases made at prices
ranging from $82 to $95.171 The stock then fell to $12.172 Temasek, the
transparent Singapore SWF, publicly reported a loss of $27.7 billion for its
fiscal year ending in March 2009.173 In September 2009, a second
Singapore SWF, The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation
("GIC"), 174 announced that its portfolio of more than $100 billion in
international investments had lost more than 20% of its value through
March 2009.175 Deutsche Bank estimates that overall equity investment
portfolios of SWFs (i.e., not just investments in financial institutions
166. UBS, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche
Bank.
167. Fotak, Li, & Megginson, supra note 164. Indeed all but one of these investments
were made in the 12 months preceding the shocking collapse of the New York based
investment bank, Bear Stearns, in mid-March 2008. The collapse of Bear marked the
awakening of the world to the enormity of the economic crisis of the first decade of the 21 s'
Century. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. on September 15, 2008
confirmed this for any remaining skeptics.
168. Id. at 57.
169. See, e.g., Kern, supra note 45.
170. Sovereign Wealth: Winners and Losers, INVESTING STRATEGY, July 28, 2009.
171. Jonathan Keehner & Serena Saitto, Dubai's Trail of Dud Deals Shows Sovereign
Wealth Gone Awry, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 14, 2009. http://www.bloomberg.conmapps/news?
pid=20670001 &sid=aywz2PJu7wf8.
172. id.
173. Shamim Adam, Temasek's Public Co-Investors Plan May Ease Suspicion
(Updatel), BLOOMBERG, July 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=a.arR5VkmJy4.
174. THE GOVERNMENT OF SINGAPORE INVESTMENT CORPORATION PTE LTD., REPORT
ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PORTFOLIO FOR THE YEAR 2008/09 10 (2009),
http://www.gic.com.sgfPDF/GIC-Report_2009.pdf.
175. Kevin Lim, UPDATE I-Wealth Fund GIC's Portfolio Recovers, Looks To Asia,
REUTERS, Sept. 28, 2009, http://www.reuters.comarticle/idUSSIN4855 1520090928.
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included in Table 2) may have fallen as much as 45% between January 2007
and mid-2009.1
76
Despite these unprecedented losses, SWFs did not succumb to panic and
sell off their losing investments. The absence of panic selling,, or indeed,
any significant sell off at all, is consistent with the conclusion that SWFs are
managed by sophisticated investment managers with a long-term
perspective. Thus, even without knowing the investment philosophy or
long term strategy for many of the SWFs, the available data suggests that
SWFs have acted like private funds managed for wealth maximization.
A. SWF Investment Adjustments Arising from the Crisis
Redeploying assets is the right of any investor, whether responsible to
one or more private investors or to a sovereign nation. In an economic
slowdown or crisis, however, funds that are set aside for future generations
and thus deliberately removed from the immediate spending plans of the
legislature or executive, are attractive to politicians dealing with projected
budget deficits. Resisting the temptation to tap SWFs by redirecting
investment to projects in the SWFs home jurisdiction or to current expenses
can be particularly difficult, even if economically optimal.' 77
In the present crisis there has been domestic criticism in some
jurisdictions that have SWFs. 178 Evidence exists of some refocusing of
investment behavior by some SWFs triggered, at least in part, by domestic
political pressures. A few examples that demonstrate the shift in investment
behavior are listed below:
" Russia announced that it has removed $43.7 billion from one of its two
SWFs to cover a shortfall in its 2009 budget. 1
79
* Brazilian officials have discussed taking a portion of its SWF, established
only at the end of 2008, to cover a possible upcoming election year budget
shortfall in 2010.18°
* The Kuwait Investment Authority formally announced that its massive
SWF will refrain from further international investments and focus on
domestic investing. 81
176. See Kern, supra note 45.
177. It might be noted in passing that the U.S. has seldom been able to resist the
political pressures to spend and incur additional debt.
178. Just two examples are Norway and China.
179. Toni Vorobyova, Russia Oil Fund to Cover Budget Shortfalls, REUTERS, Feb. 3,
2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE51203F20090203.
180. Andre Soliani, Brazil May Tap Wealth Fund Next Year, Bernardo Says
(Update2), BLOOMBERG, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20670001&sid=aHzF5HN4b4dA ("'Brazil may tap its 15.8 billion real ($8.6 billion)
sovereign wealth fund next year to help finance spending without widening the budget
deficit,' Planning and Budget Minister Paulo Bernardo said.").
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* Other SWFs have made international investments that involve immediate
domestic benefits as well. For example, an Abu Dhabi investment with
General Electric includes arrangements for GE renewable energy
technology to be transferred to Masdar Energy City, a project of Abu
Dhabi's Mubadala Development Company. 182 Also, a $2.7 billion
Daimler transaction, completed in March, 2009, gave Aabar Investments a
9.1% stake in Daimler and involves a joint venture for electric automobiles
and a training center in Abu Dhabi for its engineers. '83
* Temasek, with a long and impressive track record of successful investing,
is considering packaging and selling portions of its investment portfolio to
the public. 184
* Temasek is also considering managing investment funds for others. With
its stellar investment record such a move should be successful and would
blur "the line[] between public and private [debt]. This may be the future
of sovereign wealth funds."'
185
" Norway has also taken advantage the opportunities accompanying the
worldwide collapse of equity markets. It has announced a rebalancing of
its entire portfolio, It now plans to have 60% of its portfolio in equities, an
increase from the previous, more conservative allocation of 40%.
186
As further evidence that SWFs act like rational private investors, SWFs
have been described in the press as "vulture" investors, the latter a term
normally associated with aggressive hedge funds and others who have the
cash to seize upon an opportunity to acquire "distressed" assets.
187
One impact of the crisis has been increased focus at home on the foreign
investment activities of various SWFs. The transparent, super-large
Norwegian Government Pension Fund - Global,1 88 has encountered
significant domestic political pressures. In the September 2009 Norwegian
election, each political party campaigned in part on the proper allocation of
181. Kuwait SWF to Puruse [sic] Foreign Investments, REUTERS, Jan. 17, 2009,
http://in.reuters.comlarticlelasiaCompanyAndMarketslidlNLH692907 20 0 90117.
182. Paritosh Bansal, Mideast Sovereign Funds Seek Reciprocal Investment, REUTERS,
Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssComputerHardware/idUSN084148622
0080908.
183. Zach Lowe, Sherman & Sterling, Skadden, Freshfields, on Daimler-Abu Dhabi
Stock Deal, AMLAw DAILY, Mar. 24, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/
2009/03/shearman.html.
184. Adam, supra note 173.
185. Id.
186. Gwladys Fouche, Norway's Sovereign Wealth Fund: £259bn and Growing,
GUARDIAN (UK), Sept. 20, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/sep/20/norway-
sovereign-wealth-fund.
187. Zhang Ruimin, the Chairman and CEO of Haier, the world's largest
manufacturer of refrigerators, refers to his company's acquisition targets as "stunned fish,"
which are "good companies waylaid, often by circumstances beyond their control."
Creative Destruction Proves Winning Strategy for Fridge-Maker, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009.
188. See GERARD LYONS, STANDARD CHARTERED, STATE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 6 (2007) ("Norway is perhaps the best example of a fully
transparent fund.").
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resources in the national SWF. Norway's SWF acknowledges that
domestic political considerations have had a direct impact on its investment
decisions. Despite the objections of the SWF's CEO, Norway has more
than twenty-five companies on a blacklist for various, non-financial reasons.
As one example, the Norwegian SWF's holdings of Wal-Mart were sold
because of that company's resistance to labor union organizing efforts and
other violations of workers' human rights. Elbit, an Israeli company, has
been blacklisted by Norway because it produces surveillance systems used
on the wall separating the West Bank from Israel. 89
B. The Crisis and the Chinese Reaction
In analyzing the unique risks posed by SWFs, China is a special case.
The dramatic growth of China's soft power and influence is the hallmark of
the first decade of the 21s" century. 90 Since 2004, the media has offered
sound bites to the public that have routinely referred to the challenge
China's currently uniquely successful form of state capitalism' 9' poses to
free market forms of capitalism. China's stunning success requires that we
take a brief look at its role in the global economy. 192
China's $297 billion SWF, CIC, created only at the end of 2007, has
been hyper-active during the crisis. China also has hundreds of billions of
additional foreign exchange assets in its State Agency for Foreign Exchange
("SAFE"), which some believe also acts as a SWF, making
unacknowledged international investments. China has also deployed its $2
trillion in foreign exchange reserves as loans from the state to support
activities of Chinese SOEs in pursuit of goals that coincide with the
diplomatic and economic goals of China itself.
The pace of foreign investment by Chinese SOEs and CIC has
accelerated during the crisis. Foreign direct investment by Chinese
companies totaled less than $50 billion in the five years ending in 2007. For
2008 and 2009, according to the Chinese Commerce Ministry, Chinese
companies are on track to invest over $100 billion.' 93 Fortuitous timing and
189. Aasa Christine Stoltz & Wojciech Moskwa, Norway Fund Sells Israeli Shares on
Ethical Grounds, REUTERS, Sept. 3, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE582010
20090903.
190. See supra text accompanying note 7.
191. See generally Fen Osler Hampson, The New China Syndrome: The Threat to
Canada, FIN. POST, Sept. 14, 2009, http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpcomment/
archive/2009/09/l 4/the-new-china-syndrome-the-threat-to-canada.aspx.
192. See Fastest-Growing Economies Join G-8 Summit, CBS NEwS, July 9, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/09/world/main5146008.shtml (China is noted as
one of the five fastest growing market economies; this is evident by their invitation as guests
to the annual G-8 Summit of 2009 to discuss issues ranging from international trade to global
economic growth).
193. Dexter Roberts & Frederik Balfour, China's Shopping Spree, Bus. WK., July 27,
2009, at 42.
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trillions in investable cash has led China, through its SWF and its SOEs, to
act just like a wealth-maximizing private investor.
C. The Ice Cream Problem
While China's acknowledged SWF, CIC, is not the largest such fund,
China itself holds more than $2 trillion in foreign currency holdings, 94 and
more dollar reserves than any other nation. Given the fall of the dollar
against the Euro and the yen and the inflationary potential of the trillions of
dollars of new commitments the U.S. Government has made to ameliorate
the impact of the economic crisis, China can be viewed as a prisoner of its
vast dollar holdings. Were it to attempt to sell its U.S. Treasury and related
debt instruments, it is widely understood that the value of its dollar
denominated holdings would immediately collapse. 195  China fully
recognizes this problem. It refers to the $1.2 trillion in dollar instruments as
"melting ice cream."' 96 China's solution to this challenge is to spend its
dollar assets to purchase or gain access to hard assets, including
manufacturing facilities and commodities.
CIC reported in 2008 that it had invested less than 15% of its available
assets, including 9% in bonds and fixed income securities and only 3.2% in
equities, leaving 87%, or $260 billion, in cash and cash equivalents
available to take advantage of the global drop in commodities and other
prices. 97 Although China's $1.2 trillion in dollar assets may be "melting,"
CIC, and China's SOEs are in an ideal position to spend China's dollar
assets to acquire manufacturing assets, commodities, or interests in
enterprises which control commodities, and to do so at favorable prices,
which reflect the collapse of the global economy.
Chinese companies have purchased Hummer, one of General Motors'
automobile brands, and have sought to purchase both Opel, the German-
based GM car manufacturer, and Volvo, a Ford Motors brand. The Chinese
194. Truman, supra note 148, at 16-17 ('The State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (SAFE) holds a portfolio of international assets that is about 20 times the size of
CIC's international portfolio.").
195. Indeed, even rumors that the Chinese government might decide to reduce its
dollar dependency have triggered adverse market reaction.
196. See also China Reduces Holdings in U.S. Debt, BBC NEWS, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8207174.stm (noting that despite China's reduction of
US debt holdings by 3% in June 2009, "[i]n 2008[] the Chinese increased their holdings in
US debt by 52% over 12 months"); Chong Mu, Sovereign Wealth Fund Spends Billions to
Diversify Into Resources Firms, GLOBAL TIMEs, Sept. 24, 2009, http://news.alibaba.com/
article/detail/business-in-china/I100177221- l-sovereign-wealth-fund-spends-billions.html
("'China's $800 billion US treasury bonds are like melting ice cream....' said Liu Shengjun,
deputy director of CEIBS Lujiazui International Finance Research Center.").
197. V. Phani Kumar, China Sovereign Funds Sees Positive Returns in 2009,
MARKETWATCH, Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-sovereign-fund-
sees-positive-returns-in-2009-2009-08-30.
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offered to participate in the proposed purchase of SAAB, yet another GM
brand being divested. Chinese SOEs have been extremely active in 2009.
PetroChina signed a $33 billion agreement with Exxon to purchase liquefied
natural gas from a new Australian offshore field.1 9' Other Chinese entities
have purchased, or attempted to invest in Rio Tinto, a British-Australian
mining giant, and Addax Petroleum, a Swiss-based company, with interests
in oil fields in Nigeria, Canada, and elsewhere. In resource-rich Australia,
the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board reviewed 90 separate
Chinese investment proposals in just eighteen months."9
During September, 2009, CIC announced a number of transactions
indicative of its current approach - spending dollars to acquire real assets
before the ice cream melts. CIC agreed to purchase $1.9 billion in the debt
of Indonesia's largest coal company, PT Bumi Resources and invested $850
million to purchase a 15% stake in Noble Group Ltd., based in Hong Kong,
which owns and trades commodities. 200 During the same week CIC
reported committing $1 billion to Los Angeles-based Oaktree Capital
Management. 2 1 The following week it became public knowledge that (i)
CNOOC was seeking to purchase access to six billion barrels of oil in
Nigeria, 20 2 (ii) Sinochem, a Chinese chemicals trading company, had offered
to purchase an Australian agricultural chemicals maker, and (iii) China had
invested $939 million to add to its interests in gas and oil producers in
Kazakhstan.203
China's SWF has not been involved in all these transactions, but if there
is a threat from Chinese ownership of assets, there is no reason to
distinguish the risks presented by CIC, a SWF, and the Chinese SOEs, such
as CNOOC, Sinochem, or PetroChina. Each of these SOEs could be subject
to demands from China to conduct politically motivated investing.2°4
198. Fayen Wong & Tom Miles, Exxon, China Sign $41 Billion Australian Gas Deal,
REUTERS, Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE57H20A
20090818?feedType=RSS&feedName=businessNews (referring to Australian dollars).
199. John Duce, CIC Buys Stake in Kazahk Gas Company for $939 Million (Update
3), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&
sid=ai.Vp42hMOqQ.
200. Id.
201. Lingling Wei & Jason Dean, CIC Looks to Pile Cash Into U.S. Real Estate,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB I 25243309793493085.html. The
Oaktree investment is consistent with CIC's announcement that it expects to allocate $2
billion to real estate instruments in the Unites States.
202. Tom Burgis, Chinese Seek Huge Stake in Nigeria Oil, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009,
http://www.ft.comlcms/s/0/5d72e37a-ac9O-1 I de-a754-00144feabdc0.html.
203. Peter Smith, Sinochem Offers $2.4bn for Nufarm, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/e8cec6ea-abd3-I lde-9be4-00144feabdc0.html; Terence Poon,
CIC Buys Stake in JSC KazMunaiGas Exploration Production, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2009,
http://online.wsj.comarticlelBT-CO-20090929-717334.html.
204. Monk, supra note 46, at 26.
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It should also be quite clear, however, that each of these investments is
consistent with the investment approach of a private investor, seeking long
term investments in currently depressed assets of various types.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. General Observations
SWFs have the staying power to be long term investors. They are not
under pressure from investors to generate quarterly short term gains. Long-
term growth is often a SWF's stated goal. Knowing their true, as opposed
to stated, investment philosophies or strategies does not mean that an
investee nation or its politically sensitive elected officials will know what an
investing SWF might do in the future. This applies as well to privately held
hedge funds and other types of investors. Markets in the United States and
elsewhere have been regulated based upon the premise that investors are
economically rational, acting in their own best interests. For rational
investors qua investors, this means that these investors seek wealth
maximization. Some fear the theoretical possibility that when a SWF acts
in its own best interest, that interest may not be wealth maximization, but
the political, diplomatic, or economic interests of its sovereign owner.
B. SWF's Unique Characteristic: Domestic Political Pressures
The available evidence establishes that SWFs have thus far invested to
maximize their wealth, just like large investment funds that are not
controlled by sovereign nations. If CIC and other SWFs act like any other
institutional investor or hedge fund, why the fear-mongering in the press? 2°
Can the problem be lack of transparency? Hedge funds and other large
investors operate with their investing activities somewhat hidden from
public knowledge. Some SWFs as well may not disclose much of what
they hold or what they do as investors. But with a constant influx of
investable funds and freedom from the demands of impatient investors for
instant gratification, SWFs can and do invest for the long term. So where is
the threat? If SWFs invest for the long term, their interests are aligned
with the interests of the entities in which they have invested. Was there a
need for CF1US or FINSA or comparable legislation elsewhere?
The most important distinguishing feature of a SWF is not that it
unwaveringly seeks its own political ends. Indeed, Senator Charles
Schumer, Chairman of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, has
205. A Canadian newspaper recently carried Professor Fen Osler Hampson's
commentary entitled "The New China Syndrome: The Threat to Canada." Hampson states,
"Though its money is welcome, we should have no illusions that China is a normal investor
that plays by our rules." Hampson, supra note 191.
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acknowledged that "[i]t would be perfectly rational to expect a government-
controlled fund to have non-economic motivations. ' '206 Rather, the unique
characteristic of a SWF or SOE investment is the possibility that the
sovereign will use its SWF or SOE investments for other than wealth-
maximizing purposes. A sovereign could use its SWF to take politically
motivated actions. There is no evidence that this has occurred. There is a
long history of SWF investing with no political or non-economic purposes.
Nevertheless, regardless of whether one believes the Chinese Communist
Party, which ultimately controls China's $2 trillion in foreign exchange, is a
long-term economic investor or is intent upon undermining the United
States and displacing U.S. hegemony, the possibility exists that diplomatic
and political interests or home country economics could drive a sovereign
to make an investment decision that is in the best interest of the sovereign
but not the investee company.2 °7 SWFs and SOEs are "complex political
and economic institutions '28 subject to forces other than wealth-
maximizing goals.
We have evidence that domestic demands have been accommodated by
management of a few SWFs during the current economic crisis. 209 But the
resulting changes in SWF behavior are consistent with carefully considered
investing decisions by well informed asset managers. Notwithstanding the
long history of legitimate SWF investing and the benign results of the
revealing stress test of SWF behavior during the most severe economic
crisis in seventy-five years, the risk that a sovereign might direct a SWF to
make a decision not based upon the interests of the investee company, but
upon an inconsistent interest of that sovereign, cannot be eliminated.
Moreover, SWF transparency and democracy may have the perverse impact
of contributing to the political pressures on SWFs to take action in aid of the
local economy.21°
It is precisely the transparency that the OECD and major investee nations
seek, and that the IWG's Santiago Principles promote, that gives some
domestic constituencies of SWFs the information necessary to pressure a
national SWF to change its investment philosophy or to abandon long-term
investment international investing goals for immediate domestic needs.
206. Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make the U.S. Economy Stronger or Pose National
Security Risks? Before the J. Economic Comm., 10th Cong. 3 (2008) (opening statement of
Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, Sen.).
207. See Gideon Rachman, China Makes Gains in its Bid to be the Next Top Dog, FIN.
TIMES, Sep. 15, 2009, at 9.
208. Fleischer, supra note 155, at 152.
209. See generally Kern, supra note 45.
210. See Steffen Kern, Sovereign Wealth Funds: State Investments on the Rise,
DEUTSCHE BANK RES., Sept. 10, 2002, http://www.dbresearch.de/PRODDBRINTERNET_
EN-PROD/PRODOOOOOO0000215270.pdf.
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Investments by SWFs in the United States are subject to CFIUS. CFIUS
has a quite loose definition of control. Thus, CFRUS can work to deal with
the theoretical threat some perceive by assiduously reviewing SWF, SOE
and other foreign investments in U.S. companies. We shall see over the
years, as SWFs grow in relative importance, just how well CFIUS works.
C. The Bottom Line
This review began with a hypothetical scenario based upon worst case
theories about SWFs and their influence upon the U.S. economy. SWFs are
pools of fantastic wealth, which will only grow in significance as the global
economy adjusts to higher energy prices, further economic development in
Asia and Latin America, and less irresponsible borrowing by American
consumers.
We have considered recent SWF investments in the world's leading
financial institutions and the losses almost immediately suffered by them as
the subprime crisis developed into a global economic slowdown. We have
looked briefly at CF1US and FINSA, the Congressional response to the
SWF threat. We have seen that investment activities of SWFs have been
influenced by the financial crisis. We know of the 24 Santiago Principles of
the IWG's GAPP that are intended to head off criticism of SWFs. We have
noted the perverse impact of transparency on the capacity of SWFs to
behave like private investors, driven by wealth maximization.
SWFs will grow in importance as key factors in the global economy. So
long as CFIUS is assiduously applied, it will serve the American public
interest by permitting the United States to remain open to foreign
investment while arming the federal government with instruments adequate
to deal with transactions that could pose a danger to national security.
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APPENDIX A: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE ROSTER OF SWFs
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign $431 n/a Oil 12.7 2Holdings
Norway Governmn Pension $396.60 1990 Oil 7.1 10Norway Fund -Global
SAFE Investment Non0-2 2Company Commodity
C.....ina ..... China Inyestment 288 07C ~~I .
Government of
Singapore Singapore $247.50 1981 Non- 19 6Investment Commodity
Corporation
Kuwait Kuwait Inestment $202.80 1953 Oil 12.7 6
____Authority
Hong Kong Non-
Hong Kong Monetary Authority $193.40 1998 Commodity 1 8
Investment Portfolio
Russia National Welfare $178.5 208 Oil 0.4 5Fund Non-
Singapore Temasek Holdings $122 1974 on- 0.8 10Commodity_____
Nhina  ational Social Non
Security Fund commodity
Investment
UAE -Dubai Corporation of $82 2006 Oil 2.8 4
Dubai
Li ibyan Investmnent : 6
Libya LbaInetnt $65 200)6 Oil 0.8 2
... Authority
Qatar Qatar Investment $65 2003 Oil 8.6 5Authority
Autai [ utai ......... Non-1.9
Australia ustralian Future $49.30 2004 FComoditFund Commodty
Algeria Revenue Regulation $47 2000 Oil 0.3Fund
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National $38 2000 1.1 6Fund
Bru'Li nei Inestmen $30 1983 Oil IAgency
Strategic Investment Non-France $28 2008 0.2 new
Fund Commodity
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South Korea Korea Investment $27Corporation
Non-
Commodity
US - Alaska Alaska Permanent $26.70 1976 Oil 0.5 10Fund
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional $23.10 1993 Non- 0.3 4Commodity
Ireland National Pensions $22.80 2001 Non- 36.6 10Reserve Fund Commodity
Social and
Chile Economic $21.80 1985 Copper 0.9 9
Stabilization Fund
UAE- Abu MubadalaUab Development $14.70 2002 Oil 0.3 10Company
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding $14 2006 Oil 2.9 7Company
International
UAE - Abu Petroleum $14 1984 Oil n/a r/a
Dhabi Investment
Company
Iran Oil Stabilisation $13 1999 Oil 0.2 1Fund
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund $11.90 1999 Oil 0.6 9
US -New New Mexico StateInvestment Office $11.70 1958 No- 0.2 9Mexico Trust Commodity
Canada Alberta's Heritage $11.10 1976 Oil 0.4 9Fund
Nigeria Excess Crude $9.40 2004 Oil 0.2 1Account
New Zealand Non-
New Zealand Superannuation $8.60 2003 Commodity 0.8 10
Fund
Brazil Sovereign Fund of $8.60 2009 Non- nil new
Brazil commodity
State General
Oman Sere Fnd $8.20 1980 Oil & Gas 0.3 1Reserve Fund
Diamonds &
Botswana Pula Fund $6.90 1996 0.7 1Minerals
Saudi Arabia Public Investment $5.30 2008 Oil nil 3Fund
China China-Afica $5.00 2007 Non- nil 4Development Fund Commodity
East Timor Timor-Leste $4.20 2005 Oil & Gas n/a 6Petroleum Fund
us - PermanentWyoming Mineral $3.60 1974 Minerals nil 9Wyoming Trust Fund
US -Ab Alabama Trust Fund $3.10 1986 Gas nil 6AlabamaI
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Trinidad & Heritage and
Tobago Stabilization Fund $2.90
Terenigganul
Malaysia Ivestment $2.80 2008 Oil New
__________ Authority
UAE - Ras RAK Investment $1.20 2005 Oil X 3
Al Khaimah Authority
Venezuela FHEM $0).80 1998 Oil nilI
State Capital Non-
Vietnam Investment $0.50 2006 0.1 4
Corporation Commodity
Revenue
Kiribati Equalization $0.40) 1956 Phosphates nla
Reserve Fund
Government Non-
Indonesia $0.30 2006 X XInvestment Unit commodity
National Fund for
Masuritania Hydrocarbon $0.30 2006 Oil k& Gas XI
Reserves
UAE - Emirates Investment X 2007 Oil X 2
Federal Authority
Oman Oman vemstmern X 2006 X . n/a
a Fund
20091
2006UAE - Dubai IDubai World
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APPENDIX B: 1WG GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
(GAPP) - SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES
In furtherance of the "Objective and Purpose," the 1WG members either
have implemented or intend to implement the following principles and
practices, on a voluntary basis, each of which is subject to home country
laws, regulations, requirements and obligations. This paragraph is an
integral part of the GAPP.
GAPP 1. Principle
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective
operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).
GAPP 1.1. Subprinciple. The legal framework for the SWF should ensure
legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.
GAPP 1.2. Subprinciple. The key features of the SWF's legal basis and
structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and other state
bodies, should be publicly disclosed.
GAPP 2. Principle
The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly
disclosed.
GAPP 3. Principle
Where the SWF's activities have significant direct domestic
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated
with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure
consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies.
GAPP 4. Principle
There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or
arrangements in relation to the SWF's general approach to funding,
withdrawal, and spending operations.
GAPP 4.1. Subprinciple. The source of SWF funding should be publicly
disclosed.
GAPP 4.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to withdrawals from the
SWF and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly
disclosed.
GAPP 5. Principle
The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a
timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where
appropriate in macroeconomic data sets.
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GAPP 6. Principle
The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a
clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate
accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF
to pursue its objectives.
GAPP 7. Principle
The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its
governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and
exercise oversight over the SWF's operations.
GAPP 8. Principle
The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and
have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its
functions.
GAPP 9. Principle
The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF's
strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined
responsibilities.
GAPP 10. Principle
The accountability framework for the SWF's operations should be clearly
defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or
management agreement.
GAPP 11. Principle
An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF's
operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in
accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards
in a consistent manner.
GAPP 12. Principle
The SWF's operations and financial statements should be audited annually
in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in
a consistent manner.
GAPP 13. Principle
Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made
known to the members of the SWF's governing body(ies), management, and
staff.
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GAPP 14. Principle
Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF's operational
management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and
follow clear rules and procedures.
GAPP 15. Principle
SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in
compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the
countries in which they operate.
GAPP 16. Principle
The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which
the SWF's management is operationally independent from the owner,
should be publicly disclosed.
GAPP 17. Principle
Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly
disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to
contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in
recipient countries.
GAPP 18. Principle
The SWF's investment policy should be clear and consistent with its
defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the
owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio
management principles.
GAPP 18.1. Subprinciple. The investment policy should guide the SWF's
financial risk exposures and the possible use of leverage.
GAPP 18.2. Subprinciple. The investment policy should address the extent
to which internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of
their activities and authority, and the process by which they are selected and
their performance monitored.
GAPP 18.3. Subprinciple. A description of the investment policy of the
SWF should be publicly disclosed.
GAPP 19. Principle
The SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted
financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and
based on economic and financial grounds.
GAPP 19.1. Subprinciple. If investment decisions are subject to other than
economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the
investment policy and be publicly disclosed.
GAPP 19.2. Subprinciple. The management of an SWF's assets should be
consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management
principles.
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GAPP 20. Principle
The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or
inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with
private entities.
GAPP 21. Principle
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their
equity investments' value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership
rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment
policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF should
publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities,
including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights.
GAPP 22. Principle
The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages
the risks of its operations.
GAPP 22.]. Subprinciple. The risk management framework should include
reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the
adequate monitoring and management of relevant risks within acceptable
parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct,
business continuity planning, and an independent audit function.
GAPP 22.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to the SWF's risk
management framework should be publicly disclosed.
GAPP 23. Principle
The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to
benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the
owner according to clearly defined principles or standards.
GAPP 24. Principle
A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be
engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.
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